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After the SOE reform in 1992, many Chinese SOEs went bankrupt. Millions 
of workers were retrenched all over China. Workers’ collective resistances spread 
throughout famous industrial cities. This seriously threatened the stability of the society 
and political and economic reform. However, the results of the collective resistance 
differed from group to group. The demands of some groups were satisfied by their 
factories or relevant governments, such as increasing the buy-out subsidies for workers. 
In contrast, some groups of workers did not get much after their resistance. The main 
objective of this study is to examine and explain the factors influencing the different 
outcomes of labor resistance. 
Historical institutionalism is used to explain the differentiation among the 
resistant groups in China. Although the danwei system collapsed after the SOE reform 
in 1990s, the retrenched workers can still be mobilized by using the mobilization 
strategies inherited from past institutions based on their collective memories of Maoist 
China. The ownership level of an SOE is the independent variable in this study. The 
ownership level influences the workers’ resistance in many ways, including the 
workers’ expectation, political and economic resources, solidarity and mobilization. 
Another reason why the workers from the enterprises of lower level of ownership can 
rarely succeed in their resistance partially lies on the intervention of the local 
government. Thus, the decentralization of the Chinese government is an important 
factor which should be considered in studying the social movements in China. In 
 v 
addition, the government can differentiate the worker groups and appease the ones with 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) have experienced three important 
reform stages: 1978-1984, 1985-1993, and 1994-present. In the first stage (1978-1984), 
enterprises were given greater autonomy while the central planning system continued to 
be dominant. Greater autonomy amounted to, after fulfilling state plans, increased 
flexibility in planning production, marketing and technical innovation. The second stage 
(1985-1993) featured the implementation of the Contract Responsibility System (CRS) 
in the SOE sector. The third stage (1994-present) saw the replacement of CRS by the 
modern enterprise system.1 However, after 1993, many Chinese SOEs went bankrupt. 
Millions of workers were retrenched all over China.2  
In this study, the laid-off workers (LOW) include:  
1. Workers in the “buying out seniority” scheme. The scheme is a method 
of offering compensation to workers who have been laid off but still 
remain on the company's books. Legally, the company is still responsible 
for the workers’ wages, medical costs and pension premiums and 
payments. However, once an employer - in this case the state or local 
                                                        
 
1 China's state-owned enterprises have made headway in establishing modern enterprise systems during the ninth 
five-year-plan period (1996-2000). The system is characterized by the granting of autonomy to SOEs without changing the 
ownership of the state. It is the latest effort of the Chinese government attempting to clarify the position on property rights 
of SOEs, providing a clearer definition of rights and responsibilities between the state and the management. It has been 
characterized with the reconstruction and restructuring of SOEs into corporations similar to their western counterparts and 
introduction of the new management mechanism or so called “scientific enterprise management” into SOEs. For details, 
refer to Forrester, P. L., and Porter, R. S., “The Politics of Management of People in China: From CMRS to Modern 
Enterprise and Beyond,” in Warner, M. eds. China’s Managerial Revolution (London: Frank Cass Publishers,1999), 
47-72. 
2 See Dorothy Solinger, “Why We Cannot Count the ‘Unemployed’,” The China Quarterly, no. 167 (2001), 671–688. 





government - implements the “buying out seniority” scheme, all relations 
between the SOE and the laid-off worker are practically terminated.3 
This practice has no basis in Chinese law and it is more often than not 
forced on workers. It works as follows: when a worker is laid off, the 
enterprise makes a one-off payment depending on the employee's length 
of service (seniority). The fact that SOEs can do this is a testament to the 
changes that have taken place in labour relations in China. Before the 
reforms, it was much harder for an SOE to lay off a worker. Now an SOE 
can effectively make a worker unemployed4 and bought out usually very 
cheaply, all future obligations to the worker, even if he or she has been at 
the company for many years.5 
2. Xiagang workers. The central government defined “Xiagang workers” as 
workers “who once worked for a SOE, were laid off because of the 
enterprise’s bankrupcy, and have not found any job yet.”6 Generally 
speaking, they have not dissolved their contracts with the enterprises. 
3. Workers in long leave. The workers have not dissolved the contracts with 
the enterprises. The enterprises do not give them any payoff and pay their 
insurance and the medicare.  
As a result, workers’ collective resistances spread throughout famous industrial 
                                                        
 
3 The central government announced that the “buying out seniority” scheme was illegal in 2000. Thus to avoid acting 
against the central government, all the enterprises kept the workers on the companies books. 
4 There is effectively very little real difference between being laid-off and unemployed. 
5 China Labor Bulletin, “Buying off Seniority - Selling Deprivation,” 
http://www.china-labour.org.hk/iso/article.adp?article_id=1004 (accessed April 19, 2005). 
6 China Labor Bulletin, “Buying off Seniority - Selling Deprivation,” 
http://www.china-labour.org.hk/iso/article.adp?article_id=1004 (accessed April 19, 2005). 





cities.7 In China, the collective action of laid-off workers consists mainly of formal 
presentations of grievances and demands by workers to their working units (danwei) or 
government officials (jiti shangfang), protests and demonstrations.8 In addition, many 
LOWs traveled to Beijing to appeal to their parent companies, State Ministries, the 
People’s Congress, the Supreme Court and even the Supreme Procuratorate. In 1992, 
official statistics reported more than 540 demonstrations, 480 strikes and 75 assaults on 
government offices.9 In 1993, strike activities in China increased a lot. For example, the 
number of the LOWs’ strike activities there tripled from the previous year.10 The 
Ministry of Labor admitted the following:  
“In 1994, the number of large-scale labor-management disputes (in mainland 
China) exceeded 12,000. In some 2,500 cases, workers besieged plants, set fire 
to facilities, staged strikes, or detained bosses or leaders. Such events directly 
threatened the personal safety of Party leaders in various factories and mines. 
In the Jixi Mining Bureau, enterprise leaders did not dare go to the pits for fear 
that they might be attacked by the workers.”11  
In 1996, the number of protests in China rose 50 percent over the previous 
year. 12  By the late 1990s, demonstrations and strikes had become widespread 
throughout the country.  
However, the results of collective resistance differed from group to group. The 
demands of some groups were satisfied by their factories or relevant governments13, 
                                                        
 
7 Ching Kwan Lee, “ From the Specter of Mao to the Spirit of the Law: Labor Insurgency in China,” Theory and Society, 
no.31 (April 1992): 189-228; Cai Yongshun “ The Resistance of Chinese Laid-off Workers in the Reform Period,” The 
China Quarterly, no. 170 (June 2002): 327-344; William Hurst and Kevin O’ Brien, “China’s Contentious Pensioners,” 
The China Quarterly, no.170 (June 2002): 345-360; Feng Chen, “Subsistence Crises, Managerial Corruption and Labor 
Protests in China,” The China Journal, no.44 (July 2000): 41-63; Dorothy Solinger, “The Potential for Urban Unrest: Will 
the Fencers Stay on the Piste?” in Is China Stable? ed. David Shambaugh, 79-94 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2000). 
8 Cai Yongshun, “The Resistance of Chinese Laid-off Workers in the Reform Period,” 328. 
9 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), March 10, 1993. 
10 FBIS, March 31, 1994. 
11 Marc J. Blecher, “Hegemony and Workers’ Politics in China”, the China Quarterly, no. 170 (2002): 283-302. 
12 FBIS, July 22, 1997. 
13 Relevant government referred to the government which controls the SOE. 





such as increasing the buy-out subsidies for workers. In contrast, some groups of 
workers did not get much after their resistance. Why did some groups of workers 
succeed and others fail? The main objective of this study is to examine and explain the 
factors influencing the different outcomes of labor resistance. 
In this study, the independent variable is the level of ownership 14  of the 
enterprise. The ownership level influences the workers’ resistance in many ways. They 
include the workers’ expectation of the resistance outcome, political resources, 
solidarity and mobilization. In addition, the varying ownership level of the enterprise 
influences both the governments’ political concerns and the resources 15  that the 
enterprise or relevant government can offer the workers.16  
The diverse levels of ownership could also affect the ways that the governments 
treat the resistant movements. The workers who could win were usually the ones with 
political influence, and solid unions to back them up. The governments usually ignored 
the disadvantaged workers. The governments made use of the limited resources to 
satisfy only parts of the resistant workers. Consequently, the workers were differentiated 
by the government during the resistances. In many ways, the diverse levels of ownership 
system have helped the government to stabilize the Chinese society. 
 
 
                                                        
 
14 The level of ownership will be dealt with in section 1.2 in page 5. 
15 The resources include jobs that the enterprises can provide to the workers, funds that the enterprises can give the 
workers as compensation and many other resources that will appease the conflicts between the workers and the enterprises 
and the government. 
16 The higher the enterprises rank, the more resources the enterprises or the relevant government can offer the workers. 
See, Bian Yanjie, “Getting a Job through a Web of Guanxi in China,” in Networks in the global village: life in 
contemporary communities, ed. Barry Wellman, 99 (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1998). 





1.2 Levels of Ownership – A Brief Introduction 
At the beginning of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the integration of 
Chinese society developed through the establishment of a hierarchical social control 
system, the danwei system. The danwei system was a hierarchy of state owned 
workplace units (schools, factories, hospitals, government agencies and the like) whose 
employees were guaranteed a variety of benefits denied to peasants in the countryside, 
namely, secure jobs, affordable housing, inexpensive medical care, a range of subsidies 
for everything from transportation to nutrition and generous retirement pensions.17  
The danwei supervised not only their employees’ work, but also their political 
thoughts, recreational activities, decisions to marry, divorce, or have a baby and 
practically everything else. In large and resource-rich urban state-owned danweis, 
employees found the security of permanent employment, a guaranteed wage, a wide 
range of fringe benefits and subsidized access to goods and services that were in short 
supply.18 The structure of the enterprise was organized in a similar way in terms of its 
economic and political functions and status. 
Generally speaking, the higher its hierarchical status, the more bureaucratic 
power the enterprise possessed.19 With increased bureaucratic influence, the economic 
conditions and resources of the enterprise often surpassed those of less powerful 
enterprises. The hierarchical status of an enterprise definitely affected its clout as well as 
                                                        
 
17 Lu Xiaobo and Elizabeth J. Perry, “Introduction,” in Danwei: the Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and 
Comparative, ed. Xiaobo Lv and Elizabeth J. Perry, 5 (Armonk, NY : M. E. Sharpe, 1997) 
18 Ibid., 3. 
19 Bian Yanjie, “Getting a Job through a Web of Guanxi in China,” 99.  





its status within the national economy.20 The central government-controlled enterprises 
were usually related to the most profitable or key branches of the economy, for example, 
steel, mining, petrol and automobile manufacturing. These enterprises usually managed 
many more resources than those at other levels. In 2003, China Business conducted an 
analysis of the 196 enterprises controlled by the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council. The study found that the 196 
enterprises managed a fortune of 690 trillion RMB and 8.57 million workers. 
In terms of levels of ownership, the enterprises were divided into the 
following21:  
1. Central government-controlled enterprises; 
2. Provincial government-controlled enterprises; 
3. City government-controlled enterprises; and, 
4. Collective-controlled enterprises or district government- or street 
administrative agent22-controlled enterprises. 
The ownership level of the enterprise influences the resistance results of workers 
in the following aspects. First, the workers’ expectation of the resistance outcomes 
increases with level of ownership of the enterprises that they are from. The expectation 
provides the workers with motivation to take actions. Also, the expectation of the 
outcome of the resistance played an important role in sustaining the resistance of LOWs. 
If their expectation is low, the LOWs probably would have given up early or not 
                                                        
 
20 Liu Jianjun, danwei zhongguo (the Working Units in China), 252. 
21 Ibid. 25. 
22 Ibid. 20.  





participated in the resistances at all. 
Second, the ownership level influences the political resources that the LOWs 
possess, including relations with other worker groups and access to secret information 
on relevant governments. With greater political influence, the resistance may seriously 
challenge the legitimacy of the Communist Party and attract more political concern from 
both the western media and the Chinese government. Thus, the demands of these 
workers might be met more quickly. 
Third, the ownership level influences the solidarity and the mobilization of the 
workers. If the workers are from higher-level enterprises, they possess a stronger sense 
of pride as a member of the enterprise. Such self-esteem provides a basis for solid 
resistance and mobilization. Also, workers from higher-level enterprises can usually be 
mobilized better than the workers from lower-level enterprises. 
Fourth, the higher the rank of the enterprise, the more benefits the enterprise can 
offer its workers.23If the enterprise is at a higher level, it will manage more material 
resources than a lower-ranked enterprise.24These resources make it possible or easier for 
a high-ranked enterprise to satisfy the demands of its laid-off workers.  
 
1.3 Literature Review 
A number of studies have explored the reasons for the workers’ protests and 
demonstrations. For instance, Chen analyzed the subsistence crises faced by laid-off 
                                                        
 
23 See, Liu Jianjun, danwei zhongguo (the Working Units in China), 252 and Bian Yanjie, “Getting a Job through a Web 
of Guanxi in China,” 99. 
24 Li Hanlin, “Zhongguo danweixianxiangyu chengshi shequde zhenghejizhi” (Working units in China and the integration 
of the urban community), Shehui kexue yanjiu (Sociology Studie), vol. 3 (1993): 234.  





workers (LOWs) as well as the corruption of managerial personnel. He pointed out that 
as lay-offs made workers less dependent on their enterprises, they faced a much lower 
risk in taking action against the enterprise authorities.25 
In addition, many studies focus on the influence of workers’ resistance on 
Chinese economic and political reform. For example, Cai Yongshun argued that worker 
resistance slowed down some reform measures, such as privatization.26 
However, very few exiting studies examine the outcomes of the resistance of 
Chinese LOWs. Only several studies have looked at the factors that influence the 
outcomes. For example, Cai Yongshun made a contribution by arguing that 
constraints on the local government provided workers the opportunity to take action 
and to succeed during the protests. Also, he stressed the relationship between the 
scale of the workers’ retrenchment and the results of the workers’ protests. He 
argued that because collective appeals exerted more pressure on the government, 
collective appeals were more likely to be successful than individual ones.27 In a 
later study, Cai claimed that the outcomes of the workers’ collective resistance 
depended on other external factors, including the timing of protests and appeals to 
higher authorities.28  
In another study, Ching Kwan Lee argued that the concepts of insurgent 
identities, narrative identities and collective memories played important roles in 
explaining the resistance of Chinese workers. She predicted that labor resistance in 
                                                        
 
25 Feng Chen, “Subsistence Crises, Managerial Corruption and Labor Protests in China,” 41-63.  
26 Cai Yongshun, “Relaxing the Constraints from Above: Politics of Privatizing Public Enterprises in China,” Asian 
Journal of Political Science, no. 10 (2002): 94–121. 
27 Cai Yongshun, “Managed Participation in China”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119 no. 3 (2004): 425 – 451.   
28 Ibid.. 





a period of system transition would draw on resources and influences from both the 
state and market socialism.29 Lee emphasized the influence of collective memories 
of Maoist socialism, enterprise residential communities and enterprise property in 
overcoming the crippling effects of demoralization and atomization in the wake of 
massive unemployment.30 
While these studies have increased our understanding of the outcomes of 
workers’ resistance, more attention needs to be paid to the socialist institutions that 
constrain or promote the power of workers. Although the SOEs in China went 
bankrupt after the reform in 1990s, the collapsed danwei system still played an 
important role in both mobilizing and controlling the retrenched workers. This 
study will use the enterprise ownership level to analyze the outcomes of the 
workers’ resistance and to see the influence of the collapsed danwei system.    
 
1.4 Hypothesis and Case Studies of the Thesis 
The central questions in this research are: Why did the resistance of some LOWs 
from SOEs succeed and others fail? How did the enterprise’s ownership level influence 
the resources provided/given to the workers? And, how did these resources differentiate 
the LOWs? 
The first question provides the main hypothesis for this study, namely, the 
demands of workers from enterprises at high levels of ownership are more likely to be 
                                                        
 
29 Ching Kwan Lee, “The ‘Revenge of History’: Collective Memories and Labor Protests in North-Eastern China”, 
Ethnography, vol. 1(2): 217-37. 
30 Ibid. 





satisfied through their collective resistance.  
To test the hypothesis, comparative case studies are conducted by using data 
collected through interviews in Northeast China (Heilongjiang province, Jilin province 
and Liaoning province) from August 2004 to October 2004. Of the eight case studies, 
three cases from Northeast China will be described in detail as the main cases and other 
five cases will be used as supporting ones in the argument. In each northeastern 
province, two important industrial cities were selected for data collection.  
As noted before, demonstrations and strikes by LOWs became endemic 
throughout the country and seriously threatened the stability of the society. In addition, 
the widespread resistance of workers posed a big threat to the Chinese political and 
economic reform. Northeast China was chosen as the focus of the study because the 
region represented a well-rounded picture of the Chinese planned economy. Northeast 
China is the base of heavy industry for national defense. Its stability plays an important 
role in the continuing reform of China. Between 1997 and 2002, a staggering 6,871,000 
workers were retrenched in the three provinces of Northeast China. This number 
accounted for more than 25 percent of the total number of workers laid-off during the 




                                                        
 
31 China Statistical Year Book, November, 2003 (Beijing: China Statistics Press). 
Table 1.4.1 the Outlines of the Cases 
 
 
The cases of Liaoyang Ferroalloy Factory, Fushun Vacuum Apparatus Factory and DPAB are the main cases of this study, and other five are the supporting ones. As for the reasons of choosing cases, refer to Chapter 3. 
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40 - 150 persons 
demonstrating per 
day for a month 
10 - 15 times/month · Managers 
· City government 
Jobs for these who 
required employment 
The Enterprise paid money to the 
retired workers 












(out of 260,000) 
3,000 - 20,000 
persons 
2 times/month · City government 
· Central government 
Arranged jobs for the 
children of laid-off 
workers 
The Enterprise paid for their 
heating subsidies and the medical 
treatment 
Responses from both the 
central and local government. 
Funds were appropriated by 










10 - 20 persons 
 
4 to 5 times/month · Related bureaus None  None None 
FUSHUN 
PETROCHEMICAL 







30,000 10 - 500 persons 
demonstrating per 
day for a month 
2 or 3 weeks/season · Related bureaus,  
· City government  
· Central government 
None  Another RMB 500/year for the 
years of service, the enterprise paid 











20 - 300 persons 
demonstrating per 
day for a month 
20-25 times/month · City government 
· Central government 
None  one refrigerator for each worker The Central government sent 
officials to investigate 











Over 10,000 persons 
demonstrating per 
day for a month 
9 days · City government  
· Related bureaus 
None  Repaid the salaries in arrears and 
the enterprise paid for all the 
insurance subsidies and basic home 
supply 
A change of policy towards the 
workers and LOWs in 
Northeast China, initiated by 










7,000 20 - more than 1,000 
persons 
demonstrating per 
day for a month 
Over two years · Province government 
· Central government 
· Related bureaus 
None  Almost none Responses from both central 
and local government. Funds 
are appropriated by both the 




50 million Provincial 
Government 
Controlled 
1,700 200 - 300 persons 
demonstrating per 
day for a month 
Around 10 
times/month 
· City government 
· Related bureaus 
None  None None 





As detailed in Table 1.4.1, this study will include eight cases. The cases included 
four central government-controlled enterprises, namely CNPC Daqing Petroleum 
Administration Bureau (DPAB)32 , CNPC Fushun Petrochemical Company (FPC), 
Changchun FAW Groups Company (FAW), Liaoyang Ferroalloy Factory (LFF). This 
study also includes four provincial government-controlled or city-controlled enterprises, 
namely, Jinuoer Refrigerator Factory (JRF) in Jilin, Fourth Construction Company 
(FCC) in Daqing, Longfeng Mine in Fushun (LFM), and Fushun Vacuum Apparatus 
Factory (FVAF). The LOWs from all eight enterprises protested against their managers, 
the relevant bureaus or the relevant governments. However, the outcomes of their 
resistance differ as shown later on in this study. 
The four central government-control enterprises were chosen for two reasons. 
First, all four enterprises are the pillar industries in their cities. Second, all these cities 
are the pivotal industrial cities in Northeast China. However, all these cities, except 
Changchun, are not the capital city of their province. As such, they are not affected that 
much by center–province relations. Changchun FAW was chosen to show the influence 
of center-province relations. 
The four province-controlled or city-controlled enterprises, namely, JRF, FCC, 
LFM and FVAF were chosen for two reasons. First, all four enterprises are similar local 
enterprises in terms of scales. Second, all the workers from the four enterprises adopted 
similar resistance patterns, like appealing to and talking to the managers and 
government officials and by using both violent and non-violent protests. 
                                                        
 
32 CNPC is short for China National Petroleum Corporation. 





1.5 Theoretical Framework 
Historical institutionalism (HI) theory is used to analyze the cases in this study. 
A central goal of most HI analysis is to estimate the impact of variations in institutional 
forms and configurations on a particular outcome or set of outcomes. It is historical 
because these analysts argue that once constructed at a moment in history, institutions 
typically last for significant periods of time, influencing political dynamics and 
associated outcomes in subsequent periods.33 Institutions are defined in this literature as 
the formal organizations and the informal but widely accepted rules of conduct that 
structure a decision-making or political process.34 In addition, Thelen and Steinmo 
wrote: “Institutions constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole “cause” of 
outcome…… Instead, they point to the ways that institutions structure those battles and 
in so doing, influence their outcomes.”35 
In other words, HI theory explains outcomes in terms of the joint effect of 
changing, noninstitutional variables (which are described as background variables or 
critical junctures) and “sticky” institutional factors that tend to change more slowly.36  
The main hypothesis of HI is that given similar scores on some measure of social 
structure or similar patterns of over-time change across places, associated outcomes will 
differ in the context of different institutional arrangements. Institutions help shape and 
                                                        
 
33 For a review of the types of historical institutional analyses that discussed here, see K. Thelen and S. Steinmo, 
“Historical institutionalism in comparative politics,” in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Analysis, ed. S. Steinmo, K. Thelen, & F. Longstreth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1-32. 
34 Evan S. Lieverman, “Causal Inference in Historical Institutional Analysis,” Comparative Political Studies 34 no. 9 
(2001): 1012-3. 
35 K.Thelen and S. Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” 1-32. 
36 Evan S. Lieverman, “Causal Inference in Historical Institutional Analysis,” 1013. 





aggregate the interests of societal actors.37 
The different outcomes of the resistance of LOWs in SOEs can be explained by 
using the theory of HI. By using HI, this study provides an alternative interpretation of 
the resources of the LOWs and how these resources differentiated the groups of LOWs 
as a result of the diverse ownership levels of their enterprises. In addition, this study 




There are several limitations in this research which need to be highlighted. As 
the main source of this study is selected case studies, it is unavoidable to have some bias 
in this study. The cases adopted are from Northeast China, where the danwei system was 
built for political control and mobilization of workers.38 Compared with Northeast 
China, the main industries in other regions, for example, Southern China, are not really 
heavy industries. Notably, most of the enterprises in Southern China were set up based 
on the enterprises inherited before 1949.39 In addition, in places, like Zhejiang, Jiangsu 
and Guangdong in Southern China, the danwei system did not play as an important role 
as in Northeast China. With the privatization of the economy as early as the beginning 
of the 1990s, the outcomes of the resistance of workers in Southern China did not 
appear to be affected by the enterprises’ levels of ownership. 
                                                        
 
37 Ibid.. 
38 Lu Xiaobo and Elizabeth J. Perry, Danwei: the Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative, 20.  
39 Wen-hsin Yeh, “The Republican Origins of the Danwei: The Case of Shanghai's Bank of China”, in Danwei: the 
Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative, ed. Lu Xiaobo and Elizabeth J. Perry, 60. 





Additional circumstantial factors may affect the outcomes of the resistance in 
several of the enterprises in Northeast China. For example, some LOWs taking part in 
the resistant movements in Liaoning province managed to form a temporary free labor 
union comprising of workers from different enterprises. This may increase the power of 
the LOWs. Thus, whether the old hierarchical system can offer an institutional 
instrument for the government to control and appease the discontentment remains 
questionable, at least to a certain extent. 
However, despite the limitations, Northeast China is the still a good choice for 
conducting historical institutionalism research on the influence of the “old” socialist 
system. 
 
1.7 Organization of the Study 
As indicated before, the aim of this study is to examine how the old ownership 
systems influence the resistance of LOW from SOEs in Northeast China. The chapters 
are organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 will describe in detail the resistance of workers from LFF, FVAF, and 
DPAB, the three main cases of the study. This description includes the process of the 
resistance, the mobilization and organization of workers and the results of the resistance. 
Five other cases used to assist the study will also be described briefly.  
Chapter 3 will explain the theory of historical institutionalism in detail, including 
the definition and illustration of historical institutionalism theory. The theory will be 
used to analyze workers’ resistance in Northeast China. In particular, it will test the main 





hypothesis that the socialist danwei system has affected the enterprises and their 
political sources. 
Chapter 4 will analyze three ways that the ownership level of the enterprise 
influences the workers’ resistance. They are the workers’ expectation of the resistance 
outcomes, the solidarity and the mobilization of the workers and the resources that an 
enterprise holds.  
Chapter 5 is the conclusion of the thesis and provides a summary and 
suggestions for future studies. 





Chapter 2: The Cases 
This study adopts three main cases and five supporting ones. The three main 
cases are that of Liaoyang Ferroalloy Factory (LFF), Fushun Vacuum Apparatus Factory 
(FVAF) and Daqing Petroleum Administration Bureau (DPAB). These three cases were 
chosen for two reasons. First, more data were collected from these three cases, LFF, 
FVAF and DPAB, when compared with the other five supporting cases. Second, the 
cases of LFF, FVAF and DPAB occurred in the same period and in non-capital cities. 
These similarities may make it easier to compare the impact of the ownership level, 
while other factors are constant or similar. All materials in this chapter were obtained by 
the author in the fieldwork from August to October 2004 in Northeast China. 
2.1 The Case of Liaoyang Ferroalloy Factory 
The resistance of LOWs from LFF was one of the most important workers’ 
movements in 2002. Together with the workers’ resistance from DPAB, the 
demonstration of LOWs from LFF started the third wave of the Chinese labor 
movement in the Post-Mao Era.40 In the case of LFF, the senior workers and party 
                                                        
 
40 The independent labor movement first took off amidst the pro-democracy urban movement in the spring of 1989. 
Numerous workers' federations were formed by workers and students in cities across China at the height of the mass street 
demonstrations in May and June, 1989. The workers’ autonomous federations signified the first ever nationwide attempt 
by workers to organize an independent body to articulate their political and social aspirations. Between 1990 and 1994, 
several clandestine organizations were founded which in many ways furthered the call of the 1989 movement to 
re-establish the political rights and socio-economic status of workers. This second wave of the independent labor 
movement was represented by the Free Trade Unions of China in Beijing (1991), the League for the Protection of the 
Rights of Working Peoples in Beijing (1994) and the Hired-Hands Workers' Federation in Shenzhen (1994). The 2002 
outbreak of workers protests marks a watershed. They are distinct from the previous decade of labor protests in their 
advocacy, constituency, actors, and modus. Hence they represent the third wave of labor movement in the post-Mao era, 
not only because of the time period and previous movements, but also due to their nature and characteristics. The workers' 
protests which took place in the Spring of 2002 were all economically driven and workplace-based. In many ways they 
also signify a step forward in the development of a labor movement because they involved stronger membership, unity, 
leadership, and a better level of organization. It also began with mass demonstrations by tens of thousands of workers, first 
in Daqing, in Liaoyang, in the rust-belt of the northeastern provinces and then in Sichuan, Lanzhou. These protests were 
against retrenchment and failures to provide adequate social security. 





members made use of the old danwei system to mobilize workers. It attracted much 
attention from both the international media and the central government and achieved 
final success. In chapter 4, this case will be used to analyze how the old danwei system 
is used to mobilize workers.  
LFF was started in 1956 as a small workshop without any advanced technology. 
Through the reform in the handicraft industry from 1953 to 1956, the workers 
maintained the spirit of “not afraid of hardship and death”41 and built the LFF into a 
modern industrial factory. In the 1980s, it became a big factory, with 330 million RMB 
of fixed assets, 7100 state-owned workers and 1200 collective-controlled workers. 
During the 1980s, the company provided the biggest tax revenue for Liaoyang, paying 
more than ten million RMB a year. As a result of the company’s success, a popular 
industrial slogan was “Learn from Hangang and Liaotie (LFF)” in the 1980s.  
During the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference in March 2002, a large-scale labor strike shocked Liaoyang. 
The strikes revolved around the LOWs from LFF and more than ten  other reformed 
enterprises. More than 10,000 workers joined the strikes. The protests lasted from 
March 11 to 20. The Liaoyang city government sent the armed police to arrest Yao 
Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang, who they believed instigated the demonstrations. Xiao and 
Yao were convicted as “subverting the national government.”42 
 
                                                        
 
41 Bu-pa-ku, bu-pa-si is translated as “not afraid of hardship and death.” 
42 For details, refer to http://www.china-labour.org.hk/iso/article.adp?article_id=4404 (accessed on November 18, 2005. 





2.1.1 The Resistance: its Causes and Evolution  
In the 1990s, SOEs started the privatization reform.43 The privatization of the 
SOE provided the managers an opportunity to misappropriate public assets.  
From 1993 to 1998, Fan Yichen44 served as the manager of the factory. During 
his accession, he changed most of the cadres, and did not follow proper procedure in 
bookkeeping.45 He also set up branches in Dalian, Guangzhou and Putian to divide the 
capital of the central station, reduced the workers’ wages and increased the annual salary 
of middle-level cadres and division managers.46 Each branch and department had its 
own unauthorized ways to make money. For example, even the security department 
could hire someone to sell alloy products. From 1999 to November 2002, the LFF had 
three more corrupt managers, namely, Liu Jijun, Zhao Zhangang and Zhao Wei.47 
Forced into a corner by these circumstances, the workers began to organize 
collectively in 1998 to expose and denounce the corrupt behavior of Fan Yicheng and 
his gangs. The workers petitioned and reported to the relevant departments at city, 
                                                        
 
43 As for the policy of privatization reform, refer to chapter 1. 
44 Following Fan Yichen’s appointment, he adopted a policy of cronyism in which all those who submitted to his will do 
well and anyone who resisted was dealt with harshly. All dissent was outlawed. His close aides, friends and relatives were 
placed in company positions from which he could directly benefit. At the instigation of Liaoyang's former mayor and party 
secretary Gong Shangwu, Fan Yicheng set up a number of independent enterprises(such as the Yakuang Company, 
Boronalloy Factory and the Saide Company)and arranged fictitious domestic and foreign links and contacts. These people 
worked hand in glove as a team to swallow up billions of RMB in national funds resulting in losses of billions of RMB in 
state property. Ever since this group of corrupt individuals linked up in 1995, they had brought a perfectly good SOE to 
absolute chaos: production stopped, workers were laid off and employees were driven to indescribable despair. Under the 
guise of downsizing for efficiency and encouraging early retirement, Fan Yichen cut off fifty cadres and 1500 workers. In 
1998, only one division continued production and all the material benefits for workers had been cut. Under the pretext of 
procuring goods, Fan took holidays abroad and gathered large amounts of foreign exchange to fill his own personal 
coffers. At the factory, he intimidated workers and used public funds to refurbish his house and send his two children 
abroad to study. Fan and his corrupt friends used state funds to eat, drink, gamble, engage prostitutes and other things they 
felt like doing. There were no limits to their extravagance and excesses. The material above was obtained by author in the 
fieldwork in Liaoyang in September 2004.  
45 According to some interviewees, the division bookkeeping procedure did not go through the central station of the 
factory; the division managers created fake bills and destroyed accounts. In addition, it is reported that three account books 
have been illegally destroyed to conceal corruption. The information was obtained by author in the fieldwork in Liaoyang 
in September 2004. 
46 Fan did not make their annul salaries public. If the workers wanted to know, they would be fired. 
47 The information was obtained by author in the fieldwork in Liaoyang in September 2004. 





provincial and central levels. At the time, the city government officials reassured 
workers that they would solve the problems. However, officials did not really meet the 
workers’ expectations. Far from addressing the workers’ concerns in a conscientious 
manner and criticizing Fan and his fellows, the officials resorted to repression, ignoring 
public opinion and enforcing the planned bankruptcy of LFF. Even more serious was the 
refusal of the officials to pay the pension insurance contributions of employees from 
1995 to 2000, resulting in arrears of twenty seven million RMB. After the departure of 
Zhao Wei, all branches at LFF stopped production and financial losses for the year 
totaled 890 million RMB.  
The meetings convened to vote on the bankruptcy were held in November 2001. 
On that day, the government ordered the police to arrest three worker representatives for 
no reason. They were placed in custody at the police station. On the same day, when the 
results of the vote were announced, police cars were deployed at the factory. Workers 
were manipulated into casting their votes in support of the bankruptcy.  
The workers decided to go to Beijing to appeal against the factory’s decision. 
From June 2000 to March 2002, they visited Beijing six times, appealing to the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Ministry of Supervision, the National 
People’s Congress, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate, the Supreme People’s Court, and the State Council. On the first visit, the 
workers brought back two important letters from the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection, one for Liaoning Province Commission for Discipline Inspection and the 
other for Liaoning Province Anti-Corruption Bureau. However, after one month, neither 





the factory management nor the Anti-Corruption Bureau had responded to the letters. 
On February 28, 2002, after three months of bankruptcy, the factory suddenly 
announced that the factory would no longer pay the workers their monthly minimum 
living expenses of 180 RMB. The workers tried to have a meeting with Zhao 
Zhaohong,48 the leader of the bankruptcy group, but without success. As a result, the 
workers turned to the city government. A director of the Economic and Trade 
Commission from the city government misled the workers by telling them that 
according to the central government’s directives, the government would only pay the 
workers living expenses for three months after the bankruptcy. But when the workers 
asked him to promise to pay the defaulted salaries, he refused to get involved. 49 At the 
time, the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference were in process. The chairperson of the Liaoyang People’s Congress, Gong 
Shangwu, whitewashed the situation in Liaoyang in a television interview. Gong 
claimed that all unemployed and laid-off workers in the city drew a minimum monthly 
livelihood guarantee of 280 RMB. This event intensified the grievance of the workers.  
On March 11 and 12, two large scale demonstrations took place, involving 
workers from LFF and many other factories in Liaoyang. The procession set off from 
LFF, went through the Intermediate Court and City People’s Congress and arrived at the 
city government headquarters. They raised a portrait of Mao Zedong and the slogan of 
                                                        
 
48 Zhao Zhaohong was an official of the judicial system of the state. 
49 The city labor union delivered a public letter to the LOWs, before the bankruptcy of LFF. In the letter, it was promised 
that, all the defaulted salaries would be given to the workers before the end of 2001. However, the workers did not receive 
any money until March 2002. 





“Dismiss Gong Shangwu, Liberate Liaoyang.”50 The police security bureau (PSB) 
officers adopted high-handed measures to keep the situation under control. They issued 
a warning to the workers’ representatives, saying that it was illegal for the workers to 
demonstrate and shout slogans, as the police had not received any application for the 
demonstrations. Nonetheless, the government officials and the PSB chief guaranteed 
that no arrest would be made. The city’s leading officials asked the workers’ 
representatives to prepare their case in a couple of days, so that when the General 
Secretary of the City's Party Committee returned, they would set a time for them to meet 
him. 
In the morning of March 17, when Yao Fuxin51 was on his way back home from 
the morning market, some plain clothes policemen arrested him. A witness informed the 
workers from LFF immediately. The workers went to the city government to enquire 
and tried to get the PSB to release Yao Fuxin. However, the city officials replied that 
they did not order the arrest.  
On March 18 and 19, the workers kept demonstrating, demanding that the 
government release Yao Fuxin. Meanwhile, the PSB issued a warning forbidding the 
workers to demonstrate. On March 20, the workers demonstrated again, ignoring the 
government’s order. The government then called out the propaganda vehicles and the 
                                                        
 
50 Ba-mian-Gong Shangwu, Jiefang-Liaoyangshi is translated as “Dismiss Gong Shangwu, Liberate Liaoyang.”in this 
study. 
51 Yao was a former worker at the Liaoyang Steel Rolling Mill, LFF. On March 11 and 12, 2002, Yao led 2,000 workers 
from the LFF and 15,000 workers from five other factories in Liaoyang in a protest against corruption and demanded the 
payment of wage and pensions in arrears. On March 17, Yao was secretly arrested by plain clothes policemen less than a 
kilometer from his home. Yao is reportedly in poor health with heart problems and symptoms of stroke. He has been 
treated and is still on medication. As of November 2, 2002, Yao has been detained for seven months with no formal 
charges. Up to now, Yao's lawyer is still forbidden to see him on the grounds that his case involves “state secrets.” For 
details, refer to http://www.china-labour.org.hk/iso/article.adp?article_id=4404 (accessed on November 18, 2005. 





armed police. The PSB arrested two more worker leaders. As a result, the workers of the 
LFF called off the demonstration. In a report to the Provincial Department of Public 
Security and Luo Gan,52 the Liaoyang city government gave false information that the 
LFF workers burned down a police vehicle and beat up some policemen.   
 
2.1.2 Organization and Mobilization of the Workers 
As in other enterprises in China, the factory managers controlled the labor union 
and the worker congress. If the workers wanted to assemble for political aims, 
especially for electing worker representatives, they might be accused of assembling 
illegally. 
However, senior party members and senior workers played an important role in 
organizing the workers. The organization of workers by themselves in LFF started as 
early as May 1999. In response, the managers asked the worker representatives to meet 
them. Some senior workers organized the “First Worker Congress” and elected fifty six 
representatives to see the managers.53  Because the workers lacked experience in 
organization, the first meeting with the managers did not achieve much success. 
However, this unofficial organization began to meet the strategic needs of the workers. 
Although the workers all worked in the same factory, the Worker Congress 
offered the first opportunity for them to become unified, after the termination of the 
party group activities from the beginning of 1990s.54 Before each congress, the senior 
                                                        
 
52 From 1998 to 2002, Luo Gan was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and secretary in the 
Secretariat of the Central Committee and State Councilor of the central government.  
53 In 2002, the workers from LFF formed their labor union based on this worker congress. 
54 For details of the party’s small group activities, refer to section 3.2.1. 





representatives would check all new representatives in order to prevent police spies 
from infiltrating the organization.  
The representatives were all volunteers, composed of both “overt” and “covert” 
representatives. Each residential community 55  had two overt representatives. The 
“covert” ones did work from behind the scene, such as printing leaflets. The leaflets 
would be circulated by the “overt” representatives.  
Another function of the “covert” representatives was to be the “new blood” of 
the Workers’ Congress. They joined the discussions. When their “overt” comrades could 
not attend, “covert” representatives would become “overt” representatives.  
Prior to meeting with the officials of the city government, the representatives 
printed out their proposals and posted them in every residential community. If the 
masses in the residential community believed that the representatives should not act, 
they would remain silent; if the masses had some suggestions, the representatives from 
each residential community would gather to discuss them and adjust their proposals.  
The representatives played an important role in keeping the LOW movements in 
order. During the demonstrations in March 2002, the representatives organized the 
workers into seven groups. One of the groups was named the “order group”56 in charge 
of keeping the demonstration in order. For example, during the demonstration, the 
workers could not block traffic at will, for fear that the plain-clothe policemen would 
have evidence of illegal actions by workers. The “order group” would analyze the 
                                                        
 
55 Usually, a danwei provided its workers with houses in the same residential communities. For details refer to section 
3.2.2.  
56 Jiu-cha-dui is translated as “order group” in this study. 





situations for the workers and asked them to follow their instructions. As a result, the 
demonstration of the LOWs was quite orderly all the way from the LFF to the city 
government. The demonstration even included many elderly people. 
The support of all employees was necessary for the success of the workers’ 
demonstrations. Many high-level cadres of integrity supported the LOWs so that some 
of the middle-level cadres were able to check the account books. In addition, some old 
ladies tried to stop the PSB from arresting some senior workers in the dormitories.  
 
2.1.3 Concerns from the International Media and the Central Government 
In 2000, when the workers started to appeal, the western media began to actively 
report the workers’ collective actions. The international media had the freedom to report 
the news, unlike the domestic media, which faced restrictions by the Chinese 
government. 
On May 17, 2000, Eric Eckholm, a journalist from The New York Times, first 
reported the May 16 protest in an article titled “Unrest Grows in China’s Old State 
Plants.”57 His report described many details of the collective action, including the 
number of people involved, the reasons for the demonstrations, and the leaders of the 
movement. On March 20, 2002, he wrote another influential report on the demonstration 
of the LFF workers, entitled “Where Workers, Too, Rust, Bitterness Boils Over.”58  
On March 11, 2002, Reuters News began to report about the workers’ collective 
actions. From March 11, 2002, the important reports by Reuters News included the 
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following articles: “Chinese Workers Protest in Northeast City Locals,”59“Update 
1-China Workers Accused of Illegal Protests-Locals,”60 “Four Chinese Protest Leaders 
Detained-Family,” 61  “Update-Four China Protest Leaders Said Charged, Face 
Trial,”62and “China Workers Allege Abuse in Rust-belt Clampdown.”63 
Also, from June 2000, the China Labor Bulletin (CLB) from Hong Kong began 
to focus on the events and make a series of reports, which included 112 articles, thirty 
seven news briefs and forty four broadcasts. Up to February 5, 2005, it traced the story 
of the two imprisoned worker leaders, Yao Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang.64 
Many other media outlets also reported about the LFF worker demonstrations. 
They included Agency France-Presse (AFP), Business Week, Financial Times, BBC and 
Associated Press Newswires. They brought the world’s focus on the LFF workers’ 
demonstrations.  
On March 29, 2002, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU)65 accused China of violating workers’ rights in handling the recent large scale 
labor unrest.66 Between 2002 and 2005, ICFTU appealed for the release of the two 
imprisoned worker leaders four times.67 CLB also appealed for the release of the two 
men many times, repeatedly phoning both the Liaoyang Federation of Trade Unions 
                                                        
 
59 Reuters News, March 11, 2002.  
60 Jeremy Page, Reuters News, March 21, 2002. 
61 Reuters News, March 31, 2002.  
62 Tamora Vidaillet, Reuters News, March 31, 2002. 
63 Reuters News, April 23, 2002. 
64 For details, refer to CLB. http://www.china-labour.org.hk/iso/article.adp?article_id=6224 
65 ICFTU has its roots in the Free World Labour Conference which met in London in November 1949. The conference 
converted itself into the first ICFTU Congress over a week later. Its main purpose then, as now, was to promote 
cooperation between all trade unions so that the workers they represent will have greater bargaining power and be able to 
use their resources to greater advantage. It is now a leading international labor union in the world. 
66 For details, refer to http://www.icftu-apro.org/flash/flash1054.html (accessed on November 18, 2005). 
67 ICFTU wrote to Zhang Fusen on July 2, 2004, and January 21, 2005, and to President Hu Jintao on November 24, 2003, 
appealing for their release on compelling medical grounds. For details, refer to 
http://www.icftu-apro.org/flash/flash1054.html (accessed on November 18, 2005). 





(LFTU) and the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) in the hope that either 
organization would get involved and represent the workers in negotiating with the 
government. 
The international media forced the Chinese government to respond and take 
action to start discussing with the workers’ representatives. 68  In addition, the 
international pressure resulted in the Chinese government not sentencing the two leaders 
of the demonstrations to death. The police even sent the hospital ten thousand RMB for 
Yao Fuxin’s treatment.69 To sum up, the resistance of LOWs from LFF attracted the 
concerns from the international media and the central government. These concerns 
played an important role in the final success of the resistance. 
 
2.1.4 Results of the Resistance 
On March 11, 2003, the Liaoyang Intermediate People's Court delivered the 
following verdicts: LFF’s former director and general manager Fan Yichen, had been 
found guilty of dereliction of his duties and smuggling. Fan was sentenced to thirteen 
years of imprisonment. The previous manager of the LFF’s import and export 
department, Liu Yongjia, was charged with embezzlement of public funds, and was 
sentenced to six years of imprisonment. The previous manager of the LFF’s resources 
department, Cao Ce, was found guilty of embezzling public funds and was sentenced to 
six years of imprisonment. The former LFF director and assistant general manager, 
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Wang Youguang, who was also the manager of the Liaoyang Iron Ore & Ferroalloy 
Distribution Company, was charged with negligence at work and illegal operation of 
business. He was sentenced to four years of imprisonment.70 
After the strike, in an effort to appease the workers, Liaoyang city government 
began to repay the workers’ defaulted salaries. By May 4, 2002, fifty percent of the 
defaulted salaries were cleared, and in June 2003, all of the defaulted salaries were 
cleared. All the workers’ medicare in arrears had been reimbursed. In addition, the local 
government paid off a variety of expenses, including housing subsidies, children’s 
health care, labor’s insurance and heating fee, totaling 200 million RMB. 
The pressure from the workers forced the corrupt officials to use all the 
government’s resources to appease the workers’ grievances. The officials began to care 
for the LFF workers. To solve the LFF LOWs’ problems in Liaoyang, the city 
government even spent its funding in advance for workers. They went to workers’ 
homes and solve the workers’ problems. If the problems could be solved with money, 
the problems would be solved quickly, as long as the workers did not question the 
factory’s bankruptcy or the management’s corruption. 
The protest of workers in Daqing and other petrochemical industries, together 
with the strikes in LFF, or for that matter, in Liaoyang, forced the central government to 
stop the “buying out seniority” scheme. Meanwhile, the strikes made the central 
government pay more attention to the problems of SOE workers. The strikes forced the 
government to meet the terms of the minimal living expense policy. After the strikes in 
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2004, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, twenty three million urban 
people obtained the minimal living expense.71 The central government was forced to 
appropriate funds to support the minimal living expense program. These funds 
originally were used to increase the salary of officials. The government also reiterated 
that the reform plan for an SOE had to be approved by the worker congress.  
During the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Communist Party of China, 
the new Hu-Wen leadership introduced the strategy of “Developing Northeast China,” 
and encouraged government investment in the old industrial base. In the aftermath of the 
strike, the leaders of every province and city began to pay more attention to LOWs. In 
the following two months after the strikes, television programs highlighted Chinese 
leaders’ concerns for the LOWs. After the strikes, Premier Wen Jiabao visited Northeast 
China three times. He made speeches in each of the three provinces, stressing on the 
great determination of the government in developing the old industrial base. He even 
went to Fuxin coal mine to eat dumplings with workers on the eve of the Chinese New 
Year in 2004. 
 
2.2 The Case of Fushun Vacuum Apparatus Factory 
The LOWs from FVAF formed the independent labor union by themselves in 
1999 as in the case of LFF. They tried to attract the attention from the government and 
the media but without success. The workers finally gave up their resistance.  
FVAF was a provincial government-controlled SOE, with 1800 workers and 
                                                        
 
71 For details, refer to http://www.molss.gov.cn/index_guide.htm (accessed on November 18, 2005). 





assets worth fifty million RMB. It was a relatively profitable middle-scale SOE founded 
in 1950. Before 1949 it was a small Japanese machinery factory. As coal mining and 
petrochemical factories were pivotal industries of Fushun, FVAF’s employees were 
mostly the dependents, children or relatives of coal miners and petrochemical factory 
workers. Arranging jobs for these dependants was one of the tasks of the factory. Its 
products used to be very popular in most areas of Northeast China. 
When the factory went bankrupt due to corruption in September 1999, only one 
production workshop was retained. The workers started appealing. This lasted for three 
years. They collected information on the corruption and illegal behaviors of the 
management and sued the manager in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Procuratorate 
and many other relevant government departments. In 2000, they broke Chinese law and 
rushed into the building of the City Party Committee. According to the guards of the 
City Party Committee, they were the first group taking this kind of violent action in the 
past 5 years. They even went to Beijing for help in 2002. However, their protests did not 
result in their goals being met. The government and the factory neither repaid the 
workers’ fifty eight months of salary, nor paid their pensions. In Chapter 4, the case of 
FVAF will be used to analyze the influence of the enterprise ownership level on the 
workers’ expectation of the resistance outcomes and the workers’ mobilization. 
 
2.2.1 The Resistance: Its Causes and Evolution 
The main reason that the workers from FVAF protested against the government 
was corruption. Just like the LFF case, FVAF managers kept poor records of their 





activities. For example, in 1999 when a private enterprise came to FVAF to pick up 
goods, no record of this event existed in the account books.72  
The manager was the leader of corruption. During the process leading to 
bankruptcy, the manager sold a machine to a private enterprise for 720 thousand RMB. 
However, this machine was worth three million RMB in the market. The total assets of 
the factory originally were worth over fifty million RMB. However, the assets totaled 
less than ten million RMB after bankruptcy. In addition, the factory owed the workers as 
much as fifty eight months of salary. Furthermore, the factory had not paid the insurance 
fees for workers for nearly three years. 
The workers were forced to choose the “buying out seniority scheme” before 
being laid off at the end of 1999. For each service year, the workers could only get a 
mere 364 RMB. According to the relevant directives, the provincial government should 
pay one third of the funds, the city government another one third and the factory should 
come up with the final one third of the money. The provincial government did pay its 
part, but the city government and the factory manager announced that they could not 
afford to pay their shares. The manager proposed a ridiculous solution: “The workers 
should buy themselves out.” Specifically, the workers were asked to submit two thirds 
of the money (242 RMB times number of service years) to the factory first. After that, 
the factory would give the workers back the total payment, namely the share of the 
provincial government and the share of the workers. Even though some workers paid the 
money to buy themselves out, the factory still owed 500 employees 800 RMB each and 
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owed around 800 employees twenty percent of the total payment.73 
In September 1999, the workers started their demonstrations and appeals. They 
first sought a solution from the City Party Committee. However, the gate of the City 
Party Committee was closed. The workers went to the City Complaint Office. The 
officials there refused to solve their problems. The angry workers rushed to the City 
Party Committee. Still, no one received them. In the end, the manager was asked by 
officials to persuade the workers to return home. A worker described the scene as 
follows: 
The manager just rushed into the headquarters and yelled at us. He said, “what were 
you doing? Did you intend to get me into trouble? You were humiliating me before 
the leaders!” Nonetheless, the City Party Committee leaders did not show up. Neither 
did any of the journalists.74 
The workers continued their appeals for almost three years. They went to Beijing 
to seek a solution. They visited the State Ministries, the People’s Congress, the Supreme 
Court and the Supreme Procuratorate. Under provisions in the Labor Law and the 
Bankruptcy Law, the workers sued their factory. 75  However, according to the 
explanation given to the workers, FVAF was a provincial government-controlled 
enterprise and there was no corresponding organization in Beijing to deal with the 
problems of a local enterprise. In addition, the funds to solve the problems of a specific 
LOW group should come from their factory and their relevant level of government. 
However, the workers did not leave Beijing. Starting from August 22, 2002, the workers 
stayed in the Complaint Office building in Beijing. In the afternoon of August 23, 
                                                        
 
73 The information was obtained by author in the fieldwork in October, 2004. 
74 This information was provided by an interviewee in the fieldwork in October, 2004. 
75 According to the Labor Law, it was illegal for the factory to default the workers’ 58-month salary. According to the 
Bankruptcy Law, the funds from the bankruptcy should be given to the workers after the bankruptcy.  





around one hundred police rushed into the square of the Complaint Office and beat up 
the workers with batons. Many of the workers were injured.  
The workers from FVAF kept appealing, despite the refusal of the company to 
return their money and the inaction of the government to get involved to help the 
workers. However, fewer and fewer workers appealed because of lack of funds.  
 
2.2.2 Organization and Mobilization of the Workers 
On August 10, 1999, a senior worker placed a notice on a pole in the factory. The 
notice highlighted the corruption of the managers and the low price at which one of the 
managers sold some machines to a private company. The notice also called the workers 
to gather in the square of the factory the next day and appeal to the City Party 
Committee. Although a cadre discovered and destroyed the flyer shortly thereafter, the 
information had spread to all of the factory workers. The workers went to the streets and 
appealed to the City Party Committee. Following this first demonstration, some of the 
senior workers formed the self-regulated committee.76  
These senior workers donated money to the committee. They tried to persuade 
other workers to donate. However, not all the workers had confidence in the protests. As 
one worker said:  
“The factory was bankrupt. No body would care for the workers from FVAF which 
was only a provincial government-controlled enterprise. Workers from the coal mine 
and the petrochemical factory had already given trouble to the government.”77 
Unfortunately, the self-regulated committee did not function well, especially 
                                                        
 
76 Zi-guan-hui is translated as “self-regulated committee” in this study.  
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after the provincial government had given its one third for the seniority fund. Although 
“buying themselves out” was unreasonable, some workers still accepted the plan. They 
believed that if they did not accept this plan, they would receive nothing.  
 In August 2003, a private enterprise bought a workshop of FVAF. The workers 
found out that the private enterprise took one hundred square meters more than the area 
of the workshop as stated in the contract. The self-regulated committee put up a notice 
and appealed to the workers to protect the factory’s public property. However, only a 
few senior workers gathered together. The leader of the self-regulated committee 
confessed that: 
Only a few workers came. Most workers believed that the factory went bankrupt and 
no body could help us. The danwei system had already collapsed. The government 
was not responsible for us. If we kept appealing, the government would send an army 
to shoot us just like the students in 1989. What was more important for the workers 
was to find jobs and get some money to support their children and parents.78  
After August 2002, the self-regulated committee only held several small-scale 
demonstrations which involved no more than twenty people each time. Some of the 
workers continued to appeal, but most of them did not expect any repayment. 
 
2.2.3 Concerns from the Media and the Government 
In September 1999, the workers sought assistance from the city television station 
and a local newspaper office. Some reporters at the television station interviewed them 
and made a report, but the station head did not approve the report and it was not 
broadcast. After that incident, the local media did not offer any help.  
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The workers also approached the CCTV TV program named “Focus.”79 Several 
journalists made a very detailed interview with the workers and took many pictures of 
the factory. After the interview, the TV station kept the materials in the archives and did 
not publicize them.80 The workers attempted to involve the international media. The 
international media expressed little interest, because the FVAF factory was a small SOE, 
and not as influential as the larger ones. 
The workers hoped to attract some attention to their movement by contacting the 
city and central governments. They wrote a letter to Premier Zhu Rongji. After their 
submission of the letter to the General Office of State Council, their manager discovered 
it. In a factory conference, the manager claimed that he had bought the letter back from 
the General Office of State Council at the price of fifty thousand RMB and warned the 
LOWs not to appeal again. When the workers went to the General Office of State 
Council again, the officials refused to see them and claimed that the city government of 
Fushun promised that it had the ability to deal with the problem.  
 
2.2.4 Results of the Resistance 
The workers did not receive the fifty eight months of salary in arrears and the 
factory did not pay for the workers’ pensions. Most of the workers were unwilling to 
join any form of protest against the manager. They placed more importance on earning 
money to raise their children and support their parents than protesting against the 
                                                        
 
79 “Focus” is famous for exposing corruption in China. It is believed that the leaders in China pay much attention to this 
program.  
80 Within the PRC, there is heavy government involvement in the media, with many of the largest media organizations 
(namely CCTV, the People's Daily, and Xinhua) being agencies of the Chinese government. There are certain taboos and 
red lines within the Chinese media, such as not questioning the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China.  







2.3 The Case of Daqing Petroleum Administration Bureau  
The LOWs from DPAB got a big success after three months of resistance. The 
case of DPAB will be used to show the great political resources the LOWs got from the 
enterprise’s level of ownership in chapter 4. It will also be used to demonstrate the 
influence of ownership level on the workers’ expectation of the resistance outcomes. 
On March 1, 2002, about 3,000 retrenched employees of DPAB marched into the 
Bureau's headquarters to protest against the management's unilateral breach of 
retrenchment contracts. By March 4, the number of protesters had risen to over 50,000. 
The movements lasted till the end of June. 
The resistance in DPAB was poorly understood by many of the managers and 
officials. The CNPC carried out the “buying out seniority” scheme in 1999.81 The 
LOWs from DPAB got 4500 RMB per service year. Some retrenched workers from 
DPAB could even get 180 thousand RMB in total, which was the largest amount 
obtainable by LOWs in China.82  
After obtaining the large “buying out” fee, some of the workers invested in the 
stock market and some started their own small retail businesses. However, most of them 
                                                        
 
81 In 1999, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji ordered the start of major restructuring in the oil industry. China National 
Petroleum Corporation branches throughout the country were to be divided into two separate companies in every oil field: 
Petrochina Co. Ltd., for the oil business; and China Petroleum Group Co. Ltd., for the oil manufacturing and refining 
work. In Daqing, all oilfield enterprises had been divided into Daqing Oilfield Co. Ltd. and DPAB. The Daqing Oilfield 
Co. Ltd. was under PetroChina Co. Ltd., which was on list in Hongkong. However, DPAB was under China Petroleum 
Group Co. Ltd.. DPAB was not as profitable as Daqing Oilfield Co. Ltd., although they have the same parent company, 
CNPC. From 1999 to 2001, 360 thousand people from CNPC had been retrenched. For details, refer to www.cnpc.com.cn. 
At first, there was little interest among the workers from DPAB in accepting either retrenchment or retirement, but after 
several months of official propaganda, threats of imminent factory closure and misleading information, some eighty 
thousand workers gave up their jobs in DPAB. 
82 The information was obtained by author in the fieldwork in September, 2004. 





sustained losses in business because they lacked experience. The main factor behind 
these large scale movements was that at the beginning of Chinese New Year in 2002 
(February 12, 2002), DPAB announced that it would stop paying the retrenched 
workers’ heating fee, around 3,000 RMB per year. Another reason was that the 
retrenchment agreement stipulated that every retrenched employee should pay 2,600 
RMB a year as their social labor contribution to the insurance company. But the fee rose 
to 3,600 RMB in 2001, and again to over 4,000 RMB in 2002. The retrenched 
employees came from all ranks: workers, section heads, and departmental cadres. 
The organization of the retrenched workers was secret. Because the workers all 
lived in the same residential area, the collective action notices spread fast and safely. 
According to some interviewees, they discussed the movement when they took walks 
after dinner in the residential area. LOWs got together and decided to go to the office 
building as a group. Some workers revealed that the leaders were all senior cadres, who 
were familiar with labor policies, laws and had connections with the media. Most 
significantly, the workers set up their own union, the DPAB Retrenched Workers' 
Provisional Union Committee, and elected the representatives.  
According to the workers who had taken part in the protests, at least two 
protesters had been detained briefly by the police on May 31, 2002.83 They were 
released later in the day. Many of the protest organizers had been secretly detained by 
the police. The protesters had stopped shouting slogans because anyone identified as the 
leader of these vocal protests had either disappeared or been detained by the police. 
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About ten leaders of the provisional union set up by the protesting retrenched workers 
disappeared in mid-March, two weeks after the demonstrations began. Over 60 activists 
from the demonstrations had been detained by the end of March.84 
The political propaganda and mobilization in the Mao’s period was still very 
influential in the workers’ mind. As such, the resistance of LOWs from DPAB had an 
exemplary influence among LOWs throughout China. Workers from the Xinjiang 
Oilfield, Shengli Oilfield (close to Shandong Province) and Liaohe Oilfield (Liaoning 
Province) Oilfields staged solidarity demonstrations when they heard about the Daqing 
workers' struggle. The LOWs of Lanzhou Chemical Industrial Corporation were also 
reportedly inspired by their fellow workers from Daqing Oilfield. They staged a struggle 
for nearly two months in order to demand better retrenchment benefits on April 22 and 
23, 2002. Last but not least, over 3,000 workers of the Huabei Petroleum Administration 
Bureau, in Cangzhou city, Hebei province, staged street demonstrations on March 3 and 
4, 2002 at the time when 30,000 oilfield workers began their demonstrations in 
Daqing.85 
The actions of Daqing Oilfield workers, especially the ones from DPAB had 
touched the raw nerves of the top leadership of the party state. Not only was the oilfield 
the most prominent symbol of industrial construction in PRC, the action also took place 
during the annual sessions of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference. Concerns had been expressed at these meetings by 
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many delegates and by Jiang Zemin, President of China and General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of China Central Committee, about the threat of social instability 
posed by the rising number of retrenched and unemployed workers in urban China.  
The DPAB workers’ action caught the attention of the international media 
comparable to workers from LFF of Liaoning province.86  
After the workers’ resistance, DPAB arranged jobs for the children of LOWs. 
The enterprise even paid for their heating subsidies and the medical treatment. Li 
Rongrong, the chief of State Economic and Trade Commission went to Daqing to 
explain the buying out scheme to the workers. The local TV programs covered the 
events and activities fully, showing that the care and help of local and central 
government officials for the LOWs. 
In sum, the DPAB workers’ resistance was a total success. The Daqing oilfield 
workers’ action shows the continued importance of Mao’s political propaganda in China. 
Mao’s thought still provides an ideological stock for mass mobilizations. This type of 
mobilization by Daqing workers caught the attention of the central government and the 
international media. It helped the workers to succeed in their efforts.   
 
2.4 Other Cases 
This chapter only describes in detail the resistance of workers from LFF, FVAF 
and DPAB. The outline of the five other supporting cases is shown in Table 1.4.1. It 
remains for this chapter to add a short description of the mobilization and organization 
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of these workers and the attention they got from the media and the government. It also 
tires to emphasize some of specificities of each case. 
 
2.4.1 The Case of China FAW Group Corporation  
The resistance of FAW LOWs was a special example, showing the relatively 
high status of workers from central government-controlled enterprises in a capital city. 
Actually, the LOWs from FAW were the luckiest according to the interviews 
conducted by this study. Because of the pivotal role of FAW in Changchun, FAW did 
not carry out the policy of laying off workers. FAW had around 100 thousand workers 
with more than 300 thousand family members in Changchun, a city with a population of 
more than six million. The factory laid off around 30 thousand workers at one time and 
arranged jobs for them one month after that. Some interviewees thought their new jobs 
were far better than their old ones. However, the factory shortened their length of 
service. Female workers will have to retire at the age of 38 and male workers at 45. The 
good thing is that the FAW pays for the workers’ pension, and they can get 
approximately 500 RMB per month after they have retired. 
During the month of unemployment after the lay off, the workers appealed to 
their managers and the city government. They organized appeal groups based on their 
division, around 20 to 30 people per group. In many ways, their original party small 
groups had facilitated the formation of the appeal group for mobilization purposes. 
Because of the rearrangement of jobs for the workers, the resistance of LOWs 
from FAW did not increase drastically. Thus, it d





international and local media. However, the city government paid much attention to the 
workers’ plight. The mayor and the City Party Committee secretary both went to talk to 
the workers. 
The resistance of workers from FAW offers a good example of the impact of the 
enterprise’s ownership. It shows how the economic resources of FAW help in facing 
workers’ resistance. The LOWs from FAW did not adopt all the resistance methods, 
such as street demonstrations or appeals to Beijing. They simply appealed to the 
managers’ office or the appeal office of the factory.  
 
2.4.2 The Case of the Fourth Construction Company, Daqing 
The FCC was a city government-controlled enterprise in Daqing. Facing low 
cost competition from rural construction companies, the workload of the FCC was 
reduced to 40% of the workload before reform in 1999. The LOWs from this enterprise 
were all on “long leave.” 
During 2002, some of them joined the resistance of the workers from DPAB 
when they heard the news. However, this did not last long. One of the interviewees said 
the following: 
We knew that the workers from DPAB were the ones whom Chairman Mao had 
asked everyone to learn from. We were only a small local company established to 
support the work of the oilfield. The girls from the oilfield were not even willing to 
get married with the guys from our local companies. We did not have any connection 
with the DPAB. Even if they won, it would have nothing to do with us.87 
The low expectation of success made the workers give up on resistance quickly. 
What was interesting was that most of the workers from FCC could find new jobs that 
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could at least sustain their families.  
 
2.4.3 The Case of Fushun Petrochemical Company, CNPC 
The workers from FPC formed one of the important groups which resisted the 
manager in response to the action of workers from DPAB.  
It all started when workers from FPC obtained 3000 RMB per service year after 
their retrenchment. On April 22, 2002, more than 500 retrenched workers gathered 
outside the local Petroleum Administration Bureau (PAB). The action against PAB in 
this protest was prompted by the “dishonest and abusive” retrenchment policies88. 
According to CLB sources, the police had blocked the area around the PAB in an 
attempt to head off the protestors who were, according to one witness, outnumbered. 
The protestors called for retrenchment compensation levels to be increased from 3,000 
RMB per service year to 4,200 RMB, the highest average compensation within the 
petroleum industry. They also called upon the corporation to undertake employment 
programs for their children.  
Between May and June 2002, more workers joined the ongoing peaceful protests. 
Some of the participants were detained and then released after 24 hours of detention, 
with warnings against any future involvement in protests. At the same time, several 
                                                        
 
88 According to some interviewees, in 1999, after the announcement of nationwide restructuring of the oil industry, the 
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payments since the end of 2000. 





minor requests of the workers were met, including a request to provide more recreation 
facilities for retired workers. However, the most pressing issues, such as the request by 
the retrenched workers to return to work at the current profitable company, remained 
unanswered.  
In May, 2002, in a follow up to their mass protests, workers from FPC traveled 
to Beijing to take their case to the central authorities. These workers brought with them 
secret information, such as reports of corruption and other illegal behaviors of FPC. The 
request to increase buying out fees was later granted by FPC. The information provided 
by the workers played an important role in their success. All the information was from 
the laid-off cadres who had the network to get such secrets. 
In spite of these cosmetic gains, over 5,000 Fushun workers turned out in a mass 
protest with many more Fushun residents. On July 1, 2002, some people lined the streets 
in support of the workers. In the aftermath of the July protest, several leaders from the 
CNPC head office arrived in Fushun to renew the threat that workers would suffer 
serious consequences if they continued to protest. At the same time, officials promised 
to return some twenty-two months of overdue and unpaid unemployment benefits. They 
also assisted in the formation of a medical network to provide retrenched workers with a 
certain amount of subsidized medical care. Once again, despite these minor gains, the 
oil workers’ most pressing issue – the demand that they be allowed to return to work – 
remained unaddressed.  
 
 





2.4.4 The Case of Jinuoer Refrigerator Factory  
In the case of JRF, the retrenched workers went to Beijing and got help from the 
central government. Although some special inspectors from the central government 
were sent to investigate the corruption, they were not able to get any evidence because 
of the intervention from the local government. This case shows that the close 
relationship between the local SOEs and the local government is a big barrier for the 
retrenched workers to succeed in their resistance. 
JRF was once a famous provincial government-controlled factory. Its product, 
Jinuoer refrigerators, had been used by 90% of northeastern consumers.89 It was once 
honored as the symbol of Jilin province in an advertisement in the 11th Asian Games in 
1990.  
However, because of corruption, the factory went bankrupt in 1996. After the 
bankruptcy, the factory owed each worker 12 months of salary. Nonetheless, the factory 
gave each worker one refrigerator as payment for two months of salary. The workers 
kept appealing to the city government and the central government. Each time the 
workers went to Beijing, they presented secret information provided by some 
middle-level cadres to the authorities. The secret information was all about how a 
corrupt manager made JRF his family enterprise. It even contained details describing 
how the manager’s family sold the steel and engines to a private factory. The workers 
had even learned that the manager had bought a bullet-proof car at the price of one 
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According to the information provided by the workers, the central government 
sent some officials to investigate the corruption. According to the interviewees in this 
study, all of these officials were special inspectors sent by Premier Zhu Rongji. 
However, the special inspectors were not able to help the JRF workers. The corrupt 
manager was arrested for only one month. He was released based on his established 
personal networks in the city and the provincial government. The interviewees of this 
study said that officials in the province tried their best to help this corrupt manager by 
bribing the special inspectors. They thought that the provincial officials were all 
members of the corrupt manger’s “gang”; if the manager was arrested and sentenced, 
they would also be in trouble. During the investigation when the local officials 
intervened, the special inspectors did not get any evidence of the corruption back to the 
central government. 
In 2003, JRF was bought by Kelon Groups at a price of 40 million, only half of 
its estimated price.91 Until today, JRF still owes the LOWs 10 months of salary in 
arrears. 
 
2.4.5 The Case of Longfeng Mine, Fushun Mining Group Company 
In the case of LFM, the central government and the provincial government 
actually did appropriate funds to improve the lives of retrenched workers. However, the 
                                                        
 
90 The information was provided by an interviewee in an advanced phone interview conducted by the author in August, 
2005. 
91 For the details, refer to www.jinuoer.cn (accessed on November 18, 2005). 





funds had been used to make up for the loss of other mines which were also under 
Fushun Mining Group Company. This case provides a good example, showing that 
under the intervention from the local government and managers, the retrenched workers 
from some local SOEs cannot win much good, even though the central and provincial 
government appropriates funds for retrenched workers. 
The bankruptcy of LFM was a cheat as described by the interviewees from LFM. 
Premier Zhu Rongji visited Fushun Mining Group Company in 1999. In order to obtain 
the funds appropriated by the central government, the director general of LFM 
complained to Premier Zhu Rongji that the coal was exhausted in LFM and the 
enterprise had many redundant personnel.92 Zhu Rongji did not check the information 
and announced that this non-profitable enterprise should be bankrupt. However, LFM 
was actually one of the most resourceful mines in Liaoning Province.93  
The workers’ resistance in Daqing influenced the workers from LFM 
considerably. One of the interviewees said this: 
(The interviewee was asked if he had heard about the Daqing workers’ street 
demonstrations which had been going on for over a month.) Yes, I have heard about it. 
I have heard that Daqing workers got 4000 RMB, and still they are demonstrating. It 
is difficult for us to compare with them. Here the workers got 280 RMB and they are 
forced to sit at home all day and prevented from getting out (demonstrating). It’s 
really unfair. You know, in industry learn from Daqing, we will learn from Daqing.94 
Several thousand coal miners from LFM blocked the railroads in opposition to 
the government’s retrenchment and early retirement plans. As one eyewitness described 
the scene: 
The crowd swelled all of a sudden. The cause of the resistance was that remuneration 
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was really low. The workers were only given 280 RMB per service year and sent 
home. These were the sick ones and workers who had been laid off earlier. It was 
really a case of coercion by the management; the workers had to take it whether they 
liked it or not.  
The miners protested daily for over 10 days, starting from March 18, 2002. On 
March 29, 2002, the protesters increased to over three thousand workers. Their 
demonstration lasted the whole morning. As a result, all the armed police, riot police 
and public security offices from the city had to be mobilized.  
The workers adopted a new method to communicate and announce the time and 
venue of the gatherings. Small notices were posted everywhere, on the streets, and on 
building entrances, with the date, time and place of the gatherings. The notices were 
unsigned. If there were signatures, those who stuck out their necks would be picked up 
by the police. Thus, they just posted the flyers without any signatures. Workers did get 
together, because their own personal interests were at stake. They thought if they won, 
they could get more compensation. There was no formal organization at all as nobody 
dared to organize anything formally. Nonetheless, the factory could not stop such a 
gathering. Strictly speaking, there was no designated leader of such a gathering. If the 
police were present, workers would stand by the two sides of the railway; if there were 
no police or armed police, they would stand on the railway track. The workers had 
talked to the mining bureau chief and petitioned to the province.  
At last, the central government appropriated 100 million RMB to resolve the 
workers problems. The provincial government also appropriated 50 million RMB for 
them. However, the interviewees said that the mining bureau did not increase the 
workers’ “buying out” fees. Instead, the bureau used the money to make up for the loss 





in the other three mines which were also under Fushun Mining Bureau. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The workers became the disadvantaged group when China began the “laying 
off” policy. As a result, the LOWs, based on the danwei system, struggled for their 
rights. However, in the cases above, some workers achieved success in their resistance 
and others failed. What lead to the different results of the LOWs’ resistance? How did 
the enterprise’s ownership level influence the resources provided/given to the workers? 
And, how did these resources differentiate the LOWs? The next chapter will discuss 
how to use the historical institutionalism theory to answer the above questions. 
 





Chapter 3: The Historical Institutionalism (HI) 
Theory 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the HI theory will be used to analyze the LOWs and 
their resistance movements. This chapter will illustrate the applicability of this theory to 
this study. 
Historical institutionalists see institutions as enduring legacies of political 
struggles.95 All the classics in this genre emphasize sequencing, timing, and different 
patterns of interaction between ongoing political and economic processes in the 
formation and evolution of institutional arrangements. 
The development of institutions tends to be path dependent 96  as is the 
differentiation among workers in the danwei system. The differentiation among workers 
in both economic and political status was a feature of the former communist danwei 
system.97  
In order to formalize the argument, HI theory is used as a theoretical foundation 
for analyzing the available political, economic and organizational resources obtainable 
by LOWs. As shown below, the number of available resources is directly related to 
ownership levels of the enterprises, which influence the outcomes of the LOWs’ 
resistances. 
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This chapter includes two sections. The first section contains a comprehensive 
introduction of HI. The second section discusses how HI theory is applied to the 
resistance of LOWs in Northeast China. 
 
3.1 What Is Historical Institutionalism? 
According to Douglass North, institutions consist of formal rules, informal 
constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct) and the 
enforcement characteristics of both. Enforcement is carried out by the first party (self 
imposed codes of conduct), by the second party (retaliation), and/or by a third party 
(societal sanctions or coercive enforcement by the state).98 
Douglass North argues that institutions are the rules of the game of a society and 
consist of formal and informal constraints constructed to organize interpersonal 
relationships.99 Institutions are historical because analysts argue that once constructed 
during a moment in history, institutions typically endure for significant periods of time, 
influencing political dynamics and associated outcomes in subsequent periods. 
 A central goal of some HI analysis is to demonstrate how the salient 
characteristics of one or more of these institutions affect specific political dynamics 
which in turn produce distinctive outcomes.100  HI presumes that organizationally 
embodied routines play a crucial role in allocating resources and structuring incentives, 
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options and constraints faced by political participants.101  
Why may history be causally critical? Three important features of HI 
demonstrate the causal effect of history, namely path dependence, sequences and 
conjunctions.102 This study uses path dependence as the theoretical foundation. Path 
dependence is defined below. 
 
3.2 What is Path Dependence and Why is it Important? 
In HI, path dependence refers to the dynamics of self-reinforcing or positive 
feedback processes within a political system. Economists call this phenomenon an 
“increasing returns” process.103  A clear logic is involved in strictly defined path 
dependent processes: outcomes at a “critical juncture” trigger feedback mechanisms that 
reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern in the future.  
An interesting characteristic of path dependence is self-reinforcing. The 
institutions can be highly influenced by relatively modest perturbations at early stages. 
Once actors have ventured far down a particular path, they are likely to find it very 
difficult to reverse course. Political alternatives that were once quite plausible may 
become irretrievably lost.104 
There are strong theoretical grounds for believing that self-reinforcing processes 
are prevalent in political life. Arthur Stinchocombe claims that:  
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“Once established, patterns of political mobilization, the institutional ‘rules of the 
game’, and even citizens’ basic ways of thinking about the political world will often 
generate self-reinforcing dynamics. In addition to drawing our attention towards 
‘critical junctures’ of formative moments, arguments about path dependence can thus 
help us to understand the powerful inertial ‘stickiness’ that characterizes many 
aspects of political development.”105  
 
While new regimes attempt to impose new institutions on society like political 
reform in China, the old institution still functions. As such, although most of the 
enterprises (danwei) have been bankrupt, HI is still useful for analyzing the workers’ 
movements. As Douglass North argues: 
“Perhaps most important of all, the formal rules change, but the informal constraints 
do not. In consequence, there develops an ongoing tension between informal 
constraints and the new formal rules, as many are inconsistent with each other. The 
informal constraints had gradually evolved as extensions of previous formal rules… 
although a wholesale change in the formal rules may take place, at the same time 
there will be many informal constraints that have great survival tenacity because they 
still resolve basic exchange problems among the participants, be they social, political, 
or economic.”106  
 
These arguments can also reinvigorate the analysis of power in social relations 
by showing how inequalities of power, perhaps modest initially, are reinforced and thus 
become deeply embedded in organizations, institutions, and dominant modes of political 
understanding. Perhaps most importantly, an appreciation of the prevalence of path 
dependence forces attention to the temporal dimensions of political processes. It 
highlights the role of what Arthur Stinchcombe has termed “historical causation” in 
which dynamics triggered by an event or process at one point in time reproduce 
themselves, even in the absence of the recurrence of the original event or process.107  
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The danwei system was once used to accomplish the mobilization of workers in 
urban China. It collapsed after the reform in the 1990s in Northeast China. However, as 
analyzed in the path dependent process above, the danwei system still practically 
function in the workers resistance against their managers and government. The 
hierarchical danwei system, as a control institution set up by the communist government, 
differentiated the workers in urban China before Chinese economic and political reform. 
This institution kept reinforcing itself for more than 30 years and had embedded itself 
into urban people’s everyday life. It formed a kind of “powerful inertial ‘stickiness.’”108 
The “powerful inertial stickiness” can be seen in the different resources of enterprises as 
a result of their different levels of ownership. As stated in Chapter 2, the girls from a 
central government controlled enterprise were not willing to get married with guys from 
enterprises at lower levels of ownership. Chin Kwan Lee emphasized the influence of 
collective memories of Maoist China on the formation of a united working class.109 
However, what should be highlighted here is that collective memories of Maoist China 
also split worker groups in their resistance against the government. The variation of the 
outcomes of the LOWs’ resistance is also contributed by the legacy of the hierarchical 
daiwei system. In this regard, the next part describes how the danwei system mobilized 
and organized workers before the SOE reforms. It also briefly analyzes how the workers 
make use of the old danwei system in their resistance. Last, it describes the 
differentiation among workers based on the enterprises’ levels of ownership. 
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3.3 How did Danwei Mobilize and Organize Urban Society in the Past? 
“The Russia is a bad worker compared with people in advanced countries… the 
task that the Soviet government must set the people in all its scope is – learn to 
work.”110 
                                 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1918 
What Lenin said of Russian workers highlights an important problem for many 
developing states. That is, they want to jump-start industrialization through the rapid 
mobilization of capital and labor. To accomplish the mobilization of workers, the PRC 
designed labor policies and set up the hierarchical danwei system. As Shi Tianjian 
remarks, “To ensure its control, the government developed a unique political structure – 
the work unit (danwei) – to help the authorities control the general population in 
Chinese society...everyone was to be organized from the ground up.”111 
Elizabeth Perry and Lu Xiaobo suggested that a danwei was a working unit that 
exhibited the following attributes: 
1. “Personnel power: usually including the right to hire, fire, and arrange 
transfers. A danwei controls the dossiers of its employees, which play a 
key role in personnel-related matters. Sometimes, however, even when a 
lower unit controls dossiers, important personnel decisions are made by its 
superior unit. 
2. Communal facilities (often in the form of a compound with living quarters 
physically separated from the outside by walls) – including residential 
housing, dining hall, health clinic, fleet of cars, and other basic service 
facilities. 
3. Independent accounts and budgets: Small units within a large danwei are 
not generally regarded as danwei if they do not maintain separate books. 
4. Urban or nonagricultural purview: A rural commune or village was never 
regarded as a danwei. On the other hand, a state-owned industrial plant 
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located in a rural area is considered a danwei. 
5. Public sector: the original meaning of the danwei encompassed only work 
units that were government agencies or official organizations. Latter the 
term was extended to all types of units in the public sector.  Although the 
public and private distinction became somewhat meaningless when private 
businesses virtually disappeared during the Maoist era, in the post-Mao 
reform period it is clear that some of the functions performed by 
traditional danwei are not fulfilled by private businesses.”112 
As for the functions and characteristics of danwei, Elisabeth Perry and Lu 
Xiaobo claimed that they can be divided into two main spheres: the political and the 
social, which may be characterized as “paternalistic” and “maternalistic” respectively.113 
As in a traditional family, the danwei acts as a patriarch who disciplines and sanctions 
his children, while at the same time serves as a maternal provider of care and daily 
necessities. 114  The danwei supervised not only employees’ work, but also the 
employees’ political thoughts, recreational activities, decisions to marry, divorce, 
procreate, and practically everything else.  
A danwei disciplined its workers’ thoughts through routine political propaganda 
(called ideological work115 in China). Ideological work can be defined as the struggle to 
control communication flows and thus shape the “structuration” of the symbolic 
environment.116 A party branch secretary was in charge of the ideological work at each 
administrative level. All party members under a certain administrative level formed a 
small party group. The secretary organized regular party group discussions. The 
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discussions were comprised of several parts, namely, the study of Maoism, party 
policies, criticisms and self criticisms.117 Each party member was in charge of the 
ideological work of several workers. They organized the workers to study what they had 
learnt in the party group. Unifying workers’ thoughts was achieved through such regular 
discussions and propaganda.  
Besides the routine ideological work, the party group picked and trained 
Communist Party members among the workers. Workers who intended to join the Party 
were required to submit an application letter and report his or her thoughts not less than 
once a month.118 At least two senior party members must be willing to be his or her 
introducer. Then, the candidate would be eligible to become a party activist. The 
introducers would talk with the party activist regularly and report his thoughts to the 
party group. Party activists tended to be those who were outstanding in their work. In 
hard times, party members usually organized “encounters” to solve problems.119 Party 
activists would certainly join in these “encounters.” During encounters, no one would 
walk away until the problems were solved. Consider the case of Longfeng Mine in 
Fushun. Party members organized more that two encounters per year from 1950 to 1990 
due to heavy snow in Liaoning province.120  
To play an exemplary role in work, Party members and activists often helped 
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workers with difficulties. Helping workers with difficulties is part of “mass work.” 
“Mass work” is the invention of Mao Zedong. It played an important part during the war 
against Japan and Kuomintang. The main principle behind mass work is to serve and 
mobilize people. Having good prestige among the people would gain support for the 
CCP.121 Such organizational behaviour, combined with hard work, enabled the party 
members to be designated as “pioneer exemplars.”122  
The country honored the exemplary workers as labor models and organized all 
the other workers to learn from them. The institution of “labor models” also symbolized 
that workers were the masters of the country. Propaganda promoting workers as the 
masters of the country made workers proud to be themselves. On each hierarchical level 
in the enterprise, there would be a limited quota of labor models. In addition, the fame 
of a labor model depends on his enterprise’s hierarchical level. Workers who were 
honored throughout China probably came from a high-level enterprise. Such high-level 
enterprises were influential in the economy. Take Wang Jinxi as an example. He was a 
worker in Daqing during the initial exploration of the oilfield, the first oilfield in China. 
He was honored as the “Iron man” in the 1960s.123 His stories were reported all over 
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China to the extent that they even appeared in primary school textbooks. 
Through all these ideological work, mass work, labor models and political 
propaganda, the CCP could mobilize workers in the urban area. 
 
3.4 How did LOWs Make Use of the Collapsed Danwei System during Resistance? 
As mentioned above, the danwei system mobilized and controlled the whole 
society through ideological work, mass work, political propaganda, and labor models, 
and provision of jobs, daily care and necessities for the workers. However, the formal 
institutions such as Party groups collapsed after the workers were laid off. How could 
the LOWs be mobilized then? 
 
1. Solidarity and Mobilization of the Workers 
The exemplary influence of party members and the regular actions of former 
party group members played an important role in leading and mobilizing the LOWs 
during the resistance.  














CHINA FAW GROUP 
CORPORATION (FAW) 




5 5 100 
FORTH CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY 
2 2 100 
FUSHUN 5 4 80 










2 1 50 
LIAOYANG 
FERROALLOY FACTORY 
13 10 77 
LONGFENG MINE, 
FUSHUN MINING GROUP 
COMPANY 
6 4 66.7 
VACUUM APPARATUS 
FACTORY 
10 9 90 
Source: The data of this form was collected during the fieldwork from August to October in 2004. The 
numbers are estimates. They were provided to the author by some interviewees.  
As shown in Table 3.2.2.1, most of the worker leaders were party members. 
Before any resistance, they put up notices to reveal the factory’s illegal or unreasonable 
policies and inform the workers to assemble somewhere for collective actions. While 
facing pressure from the government or managers, the senior party members often 
employed the mobilizing skills of the former party group, such as, the use of mass work 
and ideological work. Take the senior workers from LFF as an example. As soon as the 
worker representatives got any information on the factory, they would disseminate the 
information to all the workers. Each of them was in charge of a certain number of 
workers. They not only informed the workers but also made sure that the workers were 
persuaded to their course. They were familiar with government policies, laws and even 
the activities of the managers. Because of their past prestige, workers were likely to 
follow the examples set by these senior party members. 
The public housing system also helped the senior workers to disseminate the 
information. The SOEs in Northeast China usually adopted the work unit-managed 
housing (danwei fang). It referred to housing that was managed by a particular 





danwei.124 When housing is managed by the work unit, it must be owned and allocated 
by the work unit. Usually, the danwei built a housing community, and consequently, the 
workers in the same enterprise would live in the same community. Living in the same 
community helps the spread of information. 
2. Political Resources Possessed by LOWs 
In this study, the term “political resources” refers to the following two aspects: 
1. Relations with other worker groups. Relations with other worker groups 
affect the scale of the workers’ resistance. These inter-group relations are characterized 
by two aspects, namely, the ability to attract other worker groups and develop personal 
connections with other worker groups based on both individual and public ties. 
China’s political propaganda helped SOE workers to attract support from other 
worker groups. Notably, the workers from SOEs were important political symbols 
within the context of the communist system where there is a need to show the master 
status of the workers in the CCP regime. Thus, acts of resistance by LOWs from SOEs 
were infused with negative symbolic meaning. Such actions might seriously challenge 
the legitimacy of the Communist Party. In addition, the workers’ symbolic influence 
increased with their enterprises’ ownership level. The case of DPAB provides one 
example. As Mao Zedong once said: “In industry, learn from Daqing.”125 One old 
                                                        
 
124 Bian Yanjie, John R. Logan, Hanlong Lu, Yunkang Pan, and Ying Guan, “Work Units and Housing Reform in Two 
Chinese Cities,” in Danwei: the Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective, ed. Elizabeth 
Perry and Lu Xiaobo, 229. 
125 The Daqing oilfield in Northwest China was discovered and opened in the early 1960s. Daqing became a symbol of 
economic, personal, and national self-reliance throughout the decade of the Cultural Revolution, as exemplified in such 
phrases as “The Spirit of Daqing.” During the 1964 Chinese New Year Informal Discussion, Mao Zedong at Great Hall of 
People called the people to learn from Daqing.  





worker in Fushun said, “Daqing was the holy place of Socialist China.”126 After the 
resistance of LOWs in Daqing in March 2002, the workers from many other enterprises 
in Northeast China began to participate in various forms of resistance. 127  The 
international media focused on Mao’s words, “In industry, learn from Daqing,” and 
raised questions on the legitimacy of the CCP regime. 
The ability to develop personal connections with other worker groups also 
increased with the enterprises’ ownership level. Generally speaking, a central 
government-controlled SOE was the most important industry in its city as it was the 
largest provider of jobs. Based on both individual and public ties, the workers from 
these SOEs could develop a broad social network for their movements. Hence, the 
movements led by central government-controlled SOE workers were far more 
influential than those from other SOEs.  
2. Access to secret information about relevant governments and bureaus. 
Access to secret information about the government and various bureaus is another 
important political resource the workers extracted from the communist system. The 
“secret news” here refers to the information that the workers could make use of during 
their resistances, such as news of illegal actions of corrupt officials, managers and so on.  
A danwei is composed of a dense set of political network that includes workers’ 
supervisors as sources of information.128 It is not difficult for the workers to get secret 
news about the government and bureaus through this political network. This kind of 
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information is used by the workers to threaten managers and officials to meet their 
requirements and to attract attention from international media. The information can also 
be used to help workers to appeal to the government. The case of FPC provides a good 
example. Each time workers went to CNPC, Beijing, they always took secret 
information and sometimes even some account books as evidence of the factory’s illegal 
actions.  
However, the influence of the secret information may not work for workers in 
lower-level enterprises. This was because of the fact that the local SOEs had close 
personal relationship with the local government.129 When the central government sent 
officials to investigate the corrupt behaviors of the managers, the local government 
officials would protect those managers against the intervention from the central 
government. Such relationship between the SOEs and local governments make it more 
difficult for the workers from lower level enterprises to succeed in their resistance. 
 
3. Economic Resources Based on the Ownership Level 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the higher the hierarchical status of the enterprise, 
the more bureaucratic power the enterprise possessed.130 With more bureaucratic power, 
resources of the enterprise would increase. As such, higher level enterprises usually 
managed much more resources than the lower ones. In those higher-level enterprises, 
employees enjoyed the security of permanent employment, a guaranteed wage, a wide 
range of fringe benefits, and subsidized access to goods and services that were in short 
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The resources that the highly-ranked enterprises manage make it possible for 
them to satisfy the demands of LOWs. Notably, CNPC possesses the most assets among 
all the enterprises in China. The total value of its assets was 686.6 billion RMB.131 
Daqing oilfield contributes the most to CNPC’s income every year.132 The LOWs 
believed that their contribution should entitle them to receive much more than what they 
had been paid. After the famous protest in 2002, the CNPC in Beijing appropriated 150 
million RMB to solve the problems in Daqing.133 However, compared with the central 
government-controlled SOEs, other enterprises, especially the bankrupt ones, possessed 
much fewer resources. It was less possible for them to fulfill the LOWs’ demands.  
The resources possessed by the enterprises played an important role in the 
outcomes of the LOWs’ resistance. Most of the compensations given to the LOWs are 
from the enterprises. Sometimes, the relevant government also appropriates funds to 
the workers. Similarly, the higher level government bodies often possesses more 
resources than the lower ones. 
 
3.5 How the Danwei System Differentiated Workers in the Past? 
The danwei system operates as a tool of the state for organizing and controlling 
urban society. It was through the danwei that the state mobilized the working population 
for political participation. Elizabeth Perry and Lu Xiaobo argued that “the danwei 
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allows the Maoist state to monitor the political loyalty of its citizens, particularly party 
members.”134  
Each unit was responsible for its members and the activities of members outside 
their units were also reported back to the unit. In this way, the regime was able to inhibit 
large scale organized opposition.135 Protests in China during the Maoist period were 
mainly what David Strand termed as “cellular protests,” because of the limited contact 
across unit boundaries.136 In many ways, “cellular protests” demonstrated the key role 
of the danwei system in structuring and restraining mass mobilization.137 
As for the consequences of the cellularization of Chinese society, Andrew 
Walder notes in his study of urban industrial units that danwei members became 
dependent on the unit for both political and economic resources.138 Walder argues that 
factories under Leninist regimes generated distinct forms of political control and worker 
dependency. The danwei also serves its employees’ socio-economic needs by offering 
permanent employment and attendant benefits. The welfare provisions of the danwei are 
so comprehensive that the danwei just operates as a self-sufficient and multi-functional 
social community.139  Furthermore, because of the tight restrictions on job switching, 
state workers in China did not have an “exit” option in which they could readily seek 
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employment elsewhere. 140  Consequently, the urban units are separated from one 
another and from rural communities. Yang Zhaoqiao even called the urban danwei 
system as “villages within a city”, 141  because these enclosed entities resemble 
traditional agricultural communities.
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Chapter 4: Worker Resistance in Northeast China 
 
This chapter further analyzes the eight cases of worker resistance in Northeast 
China. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the cases of LFF, FVAF and DPAB will be analyzed 
in detail as primary examples and the remaining five cases will be analyzed as 
supporting cases. The analysis of the eight cases studies the influence of the enterprise’s 
ownership level on the resistance by LOWs. 
 
4.1 Outcome of the Resistance of the Workers 
In this study, the success of worker resistance is measured by:  
1. Full or partial fulfillment by the enterprise or governments of the demands of 
workers, or  
2. Concessions by the government or the enterprise to give the workers some 
benefits other than their demands, like arranging jobs for their children.  
In this study, the cases of FAW, DPAB, FPC and LFF are categorized as 
successful ones; while the cases of FCC, JRF, FVAF and LFM are categorized as 
unsuccessful ones.142 
 
4.2 Analysis of the Cases 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the LOWs made use of the collapsed danwei system 
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in their resistance. They inherited the mobilization strategy, the political and economic 
resources of the enterprises. Further more, the danwei system affected the LOWs’ 
expectation of their resistance, which in turn will affect the outcome of workers’ 
resistance. 
 
4.2.1 The Expectation and Outcome of Resistance 
The word “expectation” is a concept borrowed from psychology. People have 
expectations based on their world knowledge. In most situations, knowledge about the 
current context produces expectations about events likely to take place.143 The workers’ 
expectation of the resistance outcome could not be measured so easily. However, any 
beneficial response from the enterprise or the government could be considered as the 
success of the workers’ resistance. Workers’ expectation of the resistance outcome is 
measured by how many benefits the workers are expecting to obtain from their 
resistance. Take the cases of DPAB and FPC as examples. The workers from DPAB 
demanded DPAB to rearrange their jobs, and pay for their pension insurance and heating 
fees; the workers from FPC only required CNPC to increase their “buying out” fee to 
4500 RMB per service year. Although they are both central government-controlled 
enterprises and both succeeded in their resistances, obviously, the workers from DPAB 
had much higher expectation of the resistance outcome than the workers from FPC. 
The workers’ expectation of the outcome of the resistance provides them with 
motivation to take actions. Also, the expectation of the outcome of the resistance played 
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an important role in sustaining the resistance of LOWs. Had their expectation been low, 
the LOWs probably would have given up early or not participated in the resistance at 
all.  
The LOWs involved in the resistances were usually older than 35 years old. For 
most of these workers, the burden of supporting the family was heavy. Most of them had 
children paying heavy tuition fees for middle or high school education and elderly 
parents who depended on them. Prolonged resistance leads to a long duration of no 
income and high expenditure, and may lead to the danger of being arrested with no one 
to look after their parents and children. The fear of leaving their children and parents to 
fend for themselves may be a discouraging factor in their decision to participate in the 
resistance. 
Table 4.2.1: Income of LOWs and Expenses for Children’s Education 
City Monthly Income of 
LOWs   
Three-year Educational 
Expenses for Middle 
School  
Three-year Educational 
Expenses for High School  
Daqing 300-800 RMB 10,000-40,000 RMB 30,000-50,000 RMB 
Fushun 50-800 RMB 8,000-15,000 RMB 10,000-45,000 RMB 
Jilin 120-1000 RMB 8,000-20,000 RMB 1,2000-45,000 RMB 
Liaoyang 90-800 RMB Not available 10,000-30,000 RMB 
Note: Because there were no official statistics for expenses of each family, the data in this table were 
offered by 20 interviewees in each city. The LOWs included retrenched workers who were still 
unemployed and those who already found new jobs. 
 
Table 4.2.1 shows that expenses for education account for a big portion of the 





expenses of a LOW family. All workers hope to give their children a good education 
which would repay them back in the future. However, expenses for education impose a 
heavy burden on them. According to the fieldwork conducted by the author, the 
pensions of the retirees could be the main income for a three-generation family. Take a 
family in FPC as an example. A couple worked for FPC for more than 20 years. The 
wife was “bought out” in 1999 at the price of 3000 RMB per service year; and the 
husband was “bought out” at the price of only 300 RMB per service year because he 
was a “collective owned” worker.144 They obtained just 80,000 RMB in all for more 
than 20 years of work. In 2001, the husband suffered from liver cancer. The income of 
the whole family was the retirement pension of the wife’s father, whose pension was 
only 1,000 RMB per month. In 2003, their children entered high school, costing them 
18,000 RMB alone on the first day of registration. As explained by the wife: 
We did not want to use the “buying-out” fee which was saved only for emergency. 
We could only use my father's pension for the entire family’s expenses. The expense 
for education of my son was really a heavy burden for us. However, we have to 
support him at least till he enters the university. It would be his only chance to change 
his life. We really do not want him to live a life like us. 
 
For a retrenched worker, to continue a resistance means no regular income for a 
long time. This may seriously disrupt their livelihood. Furthermore, the workers face the 
danger of being arrested. According to CLB, there are twenty six labor activists still in 
prison in China, one of whom has been imprisoned for 23 years.145 Therefore if the 
                                                        
 
144 Collective owned enterprises refer to economic units where the assets are owned collectively and which have 
registered in accordance with the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Management of Registration of 
Corporate Enterprises Usually. For details, refer to 
www.stats.gov.cn/english/indicators/currentsurveysindicators/t20020419_17995.htm (accessed on September 28, 2005). 
145 As for details, refer to http://www.china-labour.org.hk/iso/article.adp?article_id=6337 (accessed on September 28, 
2005). 





expectation of the resistance outcome was not high enough, the workers would probably 
not be willing to take the risk to participate in the resistance or they would give up 
resisting at an early stage.  
The worker’s expectation of resistance outcome is closely related to the 
enterprise’s level of ownership. As argued in the first chapter, a higher level of 
ownership means that the enterprise owns more economic and political resources. The 
cases of DPAB and FCC offer us good examples of how the ownership level influenced 
the workers’ expectation of the resistance. As mentioned before, the workers from 
DPAB held very high expectation of their resistance, as they demanded DPAB to 
rearrange their jobs, and pay for the workers’ pension insurance and the heating fees. 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the workers from FCC only demanded FCC to pay 
the workers their salaries in arrears. Some workers from FCC confessed that they did 
not even hold any expectation to the resistance and they only wanted to express their 
grievance.  
The resistance of workers from DAPB shocked Daqing when they began their 
demonstration on March 1, 2002. Their enthusiasm and past political slogan “in industry, 
learn from Daqing” attracted many LOWs from local SOEs, like FCC, to participate in 
the demonstration. The workers from DPAB resisted for more than three months; 
however, the participation of workers from FCC only lasted for less than a month.  
The workers from DPAB kept on resisting. They were not afraid of the danger of 
imprisonment and loss of income, mainly because they had very high expectation of the 
resistance outcome. Notably, Daqing has 50% of CNPC’s estimated crude oil reserves 





and it was making profits. 
Table 4.2.2: Crude Oil Output of Daqing and CNPC 
Crude Oil Output (million tons per year) Year 
Daqing  CNPC 
2000 53 NA 
2001 51.5 106.53 
2002 51.13 103.616 
2003 48.4 122.428 
2004 46.4 128.5494 
2005 (planned) 44.95 NA 
Source: Administration Office, DPAB. 
 
Table 4.2.2 shows that Daqing produces approximately half of CNPC's output in 
recent years. Since CNPC was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2000, it has 
been one of the most profitable publicly listed companies.146 On March 16, 2005, 
CNPC announced that its net profit in 2004 was 102.927 billion RMB, which was the 
best achievement of companies listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The workers 
believed that CNPC was able to give the workers more benefits than initially offered. 
The workers also believed that their hard work for over 30 years deserved much more 
than mere 4500 RMB per service year.  
Additionally, the political propaganda during Mao’s period gave self confidence 
to the workers. One old comment on workers of Daqing oilfield was “The workers in 
Daqing oilfield can shake the Earth!”147 When talking about the difference between 
DPAB and FPC, both parts of CNPC, the workers from FPC confessed that: 
The most important difference between the two groups of workers was that workers 
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from DPAB had much more courage than us. They were the ones who constructed a 
new city in the wild in freezing winter. They were the ones, whom Chairman Mao 
said all over China should learn from.148 
 
However, in the case of FCC, its poor economic resources lowered the LOWs’ 
expectation of the outcome of the resistance. FCC did not have enough projects as it 
faced competition from rural construction companies. With a small revenue, the 
company did not have enough money to deal with the LOWs.  
In addition, its low political and economic status was another reason for 
workers’ low expectation of the outcome of the resistance. Workers confessed that their 
political and economic status could not be compared to workers from DPAB. In the past, 
the workers from DPAB were not even willing to get married with workers from local 
enterprises. The FCC and DPAB are two separate entities which do not share any 
common interests. It implies that the success of retrenched workers from DPAB could 
not be translated to any benefit for the workers from FCC.  
The workers’ expectation of the resistance is crucial to the sustainment and its 
eventual outcome. The role of expectation can also be seen in the cases of FAW and 
FPC. In the case of FAW, the workers knew that FAW was one of the top 10 profitable 
enterprises in China. According to www.enorth.com.cn, in 2004, FAW ranks the 
thirteenth place in the 500 enterprises in China.149 In an FAW subsidiary joint venture 
company with Japan, the workers had a salary of three thousand RMB per month.150 
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The economic conditions of this joint company increased the expectation of LOWs from 
other subsidiary factories. The workers would not give up appealing until FAW 
reorganized and arranged new jobs for them. Also, in the case of FPC, the workers knew 
that CNPC, which is the parent company of FPC, was the most profitable enterprise in 
China. Many workers did not believe that FPC would be bankrupt, when managers tried 
to persuade them to accept the “buying-out scheme.” Hence, part of these workers did 
not accept the “buying-out” scheme. The experience of this group of workers raised the 
retrenched workers’ expectation of the outcome of the resistance. The retrenched 
workers from FPC finally got an additional 500 RMB per service year. 
The case of FVAF also demonstrates that the workers from enterprises of lower 
levels of ownership have low expectation of their resistance. The workers from FVAF 
were mostly the dependents of workers from the mining industry or the petrochemical 
industry. The LOWs from the two industries had already used up the funds of Fushun 
city government. A worker from FVAF said: “None would care about the workers from 
FVAF which was only a provincial government-controlled enterprise.” The price of 
buying-out was lower than that of the workers from the coal mining and petrochemical 
industry. Further more, the city government and the factory could not even afford two 
thirds of the buying-out fee. All these facts would have affected the workers’ 
expectation. As mentioned in Chapter 2, when the manager proposed a ridiculous 
solution, suggesting that “the workers should buy themselves out,”151 many of the 
workers gave up the resistance after they accepted the “buying out” proposal by FVAF. 
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It is also important to know that there are other factors which influenced 
workers’ expectation of the outcome of the resistance. These could include the ability to 
mobilize workers by senior workers. The case of LFF provides a good example. Before 
the large-scale demonstration in March 2002, the workers appealed to the management 
and government for around three years. During these years, the senior workers made use 
of the old danwei mobilization institution to create a broad and firm personal network 
among the workers. The senior party members had high prestige among the workers. 
The expectation of the outcome was enhanced as a result of the broad and solid 
mobilization launched by the workers. As Cai claimed, “organizers inspire confidence 
among participants.”152 However, this study does not analyze the expectation of the 
outcome based on the mobilization strategy, because the success of workers from LFF is 
rare in China and it cannot be applied to other places.  
In summary, the workers’ expectation of the outcome of the resistance is directly 
related to the factory’s economic and political status, namely, the level of the 
enterprise’s ownership. The expectation of the outcome is an indispensable factor, 
influencing the persistence and outcome of worker resistance. 
Existing research rarely studies the role of expectation of the resistant group. 
This study is a contribution to the social movement theories. Generally speaking, the 
expectation of a resistant group provides the collective action with motivation. As 
argued in this chapter, the expectation of a resistant group is also crucial to sustaining 
the resistance. An understanding of the current context produces expectations about the 
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outcomes available. The expectation of the resistance outcome is formed by many 
factors, such as the experience of the resistant group, the mobilization strategies and the 
leadership of the organizers. The next two sections will discuss two other factors which 
also affect the workers’ expectations and resistance outcomes.   
 
4.2.2 The Solidarity and Mobilization of the Workers 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the LOWs made use of the former communist 
danwei system to mobilize the workers. The danwei system provided the LOWs with 
the following two favorable conditions: 
First, the danwei system provided the workers with organization and leadership. 
As Schumpeter has pointed out, “collectives act almost exclusively by accepting 
leadership – this is the dominant mechanism of practically any collective action.”153 In 
China, labor unions are not independent of state control. Thus the actions of workers are 
often organized by workers themselves.  
As shown in table 3.2.2.1 on page 12 in Chapter 3, most of the organizers were 
party members. They qualified as leaders because of their prestige and ability to 
articulate the demands of LOWs when confronting enterprise cadres or government 
officials. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 3, their prestige was based on CCP party 
membership training and their hard work in the factory. Their ability to communicate 
was rooted in the dense personal network of the danwei system. 
Second, ideological work and mass work are the means that the organizers 
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inherited from the collapsed danwei system. LOWs gained ideological leadership and 
organizational skills as a result of the ideological and mass work. Ideological leadership 
and organization skills are two indispensable factors for the mobilization of the LOWs. 
As argued in Chapter 3, unifying the thinking of workers was the base for mobilization. 
In the Maoist period, unifying the thinking was achieved by the ideological and mass 
work. In the workers’ resistances, ideological work was based on the collective 
memories of Maoist socialism. As Ching Kwan Lee argued, the collective memories of 
Maoist socialism offered the workers a thinking base to mobilize and struggle for their 
rights.154 During the resistance in LFF, the workers even lifted the image of Mao 
Zedong on their shoulders. Also, after the laid-off policy in Northeast China, the 
interests of a significant number of people were threatened or encroached upon. The 
threatening of common interests provided the worker another base to unify. 
“Mass work” is another creation of Mao Zedong. It played an important part 
during the war against Japan and Kuomintang. The main principle behind mass work is 
to serve and mobilize people. Existing research on social movements pointed out the 
importance of solidarity in mobilization. Charles Tilly, for example, claims that the most 
organized collectivity type is a group that combines both “catness” and “netness.” 
“Catness” (from the word category) refers to the strength of a shared identity in a group, 
and “netness” (network) refers to the density of networks among group members that 
link them to each other by means of interpersonal bonds.155 For LOWs in Northeast 
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China, simultaneous lay-offs156 and collective memories of Maoist China determine the 
“catness” of the LOWs who faced the same fate. In addition, mass work helps the 
“netness” of workers in mobilization. As mentioned in Chapter 3, workers from same 
SOE usually live in the same residential community. This helps the organizers to 
mobilize the workers. If the worker representatives mobilized the workers well, the 
density of the networks among workers would increase. 
Next, the cases of LFF and FAVF are used to demonstrate the influence of the 
levels of ownership on the mobilization of retrenched workers.  
In the case of LFF, the representatives were elected by the workers who had high 
prestige among the workers. The representatives did not receive any additional benefits 
for performing their role. Instead, they undertook more risks than ordinary participants 
because of the government’s repressive policies. In this case, four worker leaders were 
arrested during the workers’ resistance.157 In addition, Yao Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang are 
still imprisoned on charges of “political subversion.” The two imprisoned 
representatives were enticed by the authority that if they accepted all charges, they could 
be released. However, neither of them accepted the changes.  
The institutions for mass work and ideological work helped the broad 
mobilization of workers in LFF. Before every action they undertook, the senior workers 
would assure that all the workers agreed to their actions. The worker representatives 
gained the support from all levels of employees in LFF. Some middle level cadres even 
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helped the representatives to get the account books as the evidence of corruption by 
managers.  
The mobilization of workers in LFF also influenced the LOWs from other SOEs 
in Liaoyang. Based on both personal and factory connections, the workers in LFF 
gained support from workers of other SOEs. In February 2002, as many as ten to twenty 
thousand workers from both LFF and other SOEs in Liaoyang participated in the 
demonstration, which successfully caught the attention of the central government and 
the international media.  
However, compared to the workers in LFF, the senior workers from FVAF 
could not unify the thinking of workers, leading to the final failure of the resistance. As 
a senior worker from FVAF said: “What was more important for them (the normal 
workers) was to find jobs and get some money to support their children and parents.”158 
This was especially true when the manager proposed that “the workers should buy 
themselves out.”159 As mentioned in Chapter 2, after the payment of the “buying-out” 
fee for workers by the provincial government, the city government and the factory 
manager announced that they could not afford to pay their shares. Some workers 
accepted the solution of buying themselves out. Although the factory still owed 500 
employees 800 RMB each and owed around 800 employees twenty percent of the total 
payment after the “buying-out,”160 the other 1300 workers gave up their resistance. The 
belief was that “the factory went bankrupt and the government would not help us (the 
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workers). The danwei system had already collapsed. The government was not 
responsible for us (the workers).”161  
Although senior workers in FVAF did adopt ideological and mass work to try to 
unify the workers, they did not do as much work as the worker representatives in LFF 
when faced with the split among the workers. The senior workers did organize a 
“self-regulated committee” to collect secret information and organize the workers. The 
senior workers in the “self-regulated committee” even donated money for collective 
action. However, they did not really try to persuade the workers to unite among 
themselves when some workers intended to withdraw from the resistance.  
The question then arises as to why the senior workers in FVAF could not 
mobilize the workers just like the worker representatives in LFF. This question could be 
explained by FVAF’s level of ownership. Before the laid-off policy in 1990s, the 
workers from the city and provincial government-controlled enterprises could not get as 
many benefits as the workers from the central government-controlled enterprises. As 
argued in section 4.2.1, the workers from the local SOEs tended to have much lower 
expectation of the outcome of the resistance. The senior workers also had lower 
expectation of the resistances like the ordinary workers and they could not assure the 
workers of more benefits after the resistance. Hence, they usually gave up persuading 
the LOWs when the workers intended to terminate their resistance for fear of losing 
their income. Gradually, the senior workers in FVAF could not gain much support and 
active reaction from most of the workers. After the split, they could not organize any 
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more large scale actions. Thus, the government would not pay attention to a small group 
of workers from a bankrupt local enterprise.  
Social movement theories stressed on the influence of the mobilization on 
collective actions. In the cases of LFF and FVAF, they also show that the mobilization 
of workers influences the final outcome of the resistance. However, by using the same 
mobilization strategy, the two resistant groups have different outcomes. This is related 
to the workers’ expectation of the outcomes. In the final analysis, the level of the 
enterprise’s ownership level affects the workers’ solidarity and mobilization.  
It should be noted that there were different methods used to mobilize workers. 
The workers in LFF created both “covert” and “overt” representatives to protect the 
worker representatives and mobilize the workers. In the case of DPAB, the 
representatives were all covert ones. 
 
4.2.3 Political Resources Possessed by LOWs 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the term “political resources” chiefly refers to 
relations with other worker groups and access to secret information about managers, 
relevant governments and bureaus. In this chapter, the cases of DPAB and FCC are used 
to demonstrate the importance of relations with other worker groups. The cases of FPC, 
JRF and FPC are used to analyze the influence of secret information on worker 
resistance. 
1. Relations with other worker groups. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the cellularization of Chinese society decreases the 





connections among worker groups. There are no official organizations for workers from 
different enterprises to connect with each other. Consequently, the network among 
workers from different enterprises is mostly based on family and other personal 
connections. The more workers an enterprise has, the broader its network among 
workers with other enterprises.  
The inter-group relations also include the ability to attract other worker groups to 
support the resistances. The ability to attract other worker groups was promoted by 
communist political propaganda in the past. Notably, the government called on all 
workers to learn from the labor models. It also called on all industries to learn from the 
model enterprises. In this emulation “movement”, every move of the labor model or the 
model enterprise would have its symbolic meaning and influence. As analyzed in 
Chapter 3, the resistance by LOWs from SOEs demonstrated a change in the status and 
thinking of workers in China. Such actions might seriously challenge the legitimacy of 
the Communist Party. This is especially true for labor models or model enterprises, 
whose actions can attract other worker groups to support them. The case of DPAB 
provides an example of the model enterprise which has not only as many as eighty 
thousand laid off workers but also the image of a “holy place”162 in Maoist China.  
In the case of DPAB, the number of protesters had risen to over fifty thousand 
within four days after March 1 in 2002, as retirees and other oilfield workers provided 
help to the resistance. The people from DPAB who supported the retrenched workers 
could be divided into two groups. The first group was the family members of the 
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retrenched workers. Under normal circumstances, the parents of the retrenched workers 
would not allow their children to participate in the demonstration because of the danger 
of being arrested. In the past danwei system, a young worker usually obtained the job of 
his or her parent when the latter retired. His whole family would all be in the same 
enterprise, if the worker was from a central government-controlled enterprise. The 
retirees had time and money and it cost less for them to participate in the demonstration. 
The second group who supported the retrenched workers were some cadres and workers 
who were still employed. A worker interviewee by the author revealed that their 
resistance obtained the help from some cadres. The cadres provided the workers with 
secret information and advice. They even connived with the workers in their protests. 
The close network among the employees in DPAB unified the workers in the protest 
against the managers. 
The workers from other enterprises in Daqing, like FCC, also participated in the 
DPAB protest. The participation of the retirees, oilfield workers, and workers from other 
enterprises demonstrates the broad network of the workers in DPAB.  
With such political influence and connections, the demonstration of the 
retrenched workers in DPAB shocked almost all of Northeast China and enterprises 
under CNPC. On March 3 and 4, 2002, workers from Xinjiang Oilfield, Shengli Oilfield 
(close to Shandong Province) and Liaohe Oilfield (Liaoning Province), Lanzhou 
Chemical Industrial Corporation (Gansu Province), and Huabei Petroleum 
Administration Bureau (Hebei province) all staged street demonstrations in support of 
the demonstrations in Daqing. The retrenched workers in Northeast China who learnt 





about the resistance in DPAB also started their resistance. Together with the influence of 
the workers from LFF, the demonstrations of the retrenched workers formed the third 
wave of the Chinese labor movement. 
However, workers from SOEs of lower levels of ownership are in a more 
vulnerable position. There are two reasons why the workers from the enterprises of 
lower levels of ownership could not organize large scale demonstrations. First, as 
analyzed in section 4.2.1, the workers from enterprises of lower levels of ownership had 
low expectation of the outcome of the resistance. Earning a wage is more important to 
these low income workers. Thus, they are less motivated to participate in the resistance. 
Second, the families of the workers from lower levels of ownership, especially the city 
government-controlled enterprises, were not working in the same factory as the 
retrenched workers. In the case of FCC, the families of the retrenched workers in FCC 
were mostly from other local enterprises of Daqing. Only a few retrenched workers 
from FCC participated in the demonstrations in support of the workers from DPAB and 
the former workers gave up their resistance within one month. In the case of FVAF, its 
workers were mostly the dependents of workers working in nearby coal mines and 
petrochemical industrial enterprises. As such, the senior workers could not even 
mobilize retrenched workers in the FVAF, to say nothing of the workers from other 
enterprises. 
Nevertheless, the retrenched workers from some of the provincial 
government-controlled enterprises can organize collective resistances on a large scale. 
However, with the intervention from the local government or the managers of the 





enterprise, the workers’ demands could not be fulfilled in actual practice. The cases of 
LFM and JRF provide us with good examples. The demonstrations of the workers from 
LFM forced the central and provincial governments to appropriate funds to solve the 
workers’ problems. However, the funds were used to make up for the losses of other 
enterprises under the same company. Similarly, in the case of JRF, the central 
government intervened after the appeal. However, with the intervention from local 
government officials, the inspectors sent by the central government could not get any 
evidence for corruption.  
The relationship between the central government and local government would 
affect the LOWs’ resistance. In the planned economy, local governments at various 
levels were just appendages of the central government. They were economically 
dependent on national financial appropriations and had no independent interests of their 
own. With political and economic reform since the late 1970s, the central government 
allowed more management decisions to be made at lower levels. The decentralization 
process has given cities and counties significant decision-making power. Many SOEs 
are subject to the influence of local governments. Unfortunately, the local authorities are 
obsessed with economic growth and GDP growth rates, the leading criteria for 
evaluating cadre performance. As a result, the local authorities made full use of their 
administrative rights to assist and protect local enterprises. They sometimes even got 
involved in the corrupt behavior of the enterprises. Hence, unavoidably, the local 
government would be against the workers’ resistance, which would seriously threaten 
their political career. Although some groups of LOWs attracted the attention of the 





central government through their mobilization or the secret information revealed to the 
authorities (which will be analyzed in the following part), they could not succeed as a 
result of the intervention of the local government.  
2. Access to secret information. 
Whether the workers could get secret information about the management was 
another important factor for the outcome of their resistance. Secret information refers to 
information on the illegal behavior of the management. Based on the personal network 
in danwei system, it was not hard for the workers to get this kind of secret information. 
With the information as a backup, the workers could attract the attention of both the 
local and central governments, which would help them with their demands. The 
government might invoke the law if strong evidence was given or send officials to 
investigate the corruption.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the importance of secret information lies in its 
possible challenge to the legitimacy of CCP. The managers and the government officials 
were all party members. Exposure of corruption would not only ruin the political career 
of the managers and the officials but also threaten the domination of the CCP. 
Thus, although acquiring secret information is not a condition of a successful 
resistance, it helps the workers succeed in their resistance. The case of LFF provides a 
good example on the importance of secret information. 
Their secret information was provided by the middle cadres. The LOWs even 
obtained account books as evidence to sue their managers. Their demonstration was 
perpetuated by corrupt practices of the managers and many government officials. On 





March 5, 2002, they publicized the “Open Letter to the General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, Jiang Zemin.”163 The title of the letter 
was “Appeal to the Leadership Following a Fruitless Four Year Struggle Against 
Corruption. The workers are being persecuted and need your support”. In the letter, the 
workers exposed the corruption of the managers and the government officials in detail. 
Obviously, this kind of secret information provided both the impetus and legitimacy for 
the workers to resist.  
However, secret information is not as useful for the workers from lower levels of 
ownership. The workers from the JRF also obtained secret information and even caught 
the attention of the central government. Nonetheless, owing to the intervention from the 
local government, the special inspectors were not able to investigate the case.  
The relations with other worker groups and the access to secret information are 
the two political resources that the workers inherited from the collapsed danwei system. 
The former affects the scale of collective action and the political influence of the 
workers. The latter provides the workers with impetus and legitimacy of resistance, by 
threatening the political careers of managers or government officials. These two factors 
both increase the political influence of the workers’ resistance, and help them attract the 
attention from both the government and international media. The influence of these two 
factors also varies according to the ownership level of the enterprise. Whether other 
worker groups will support the resistance depends on the political status of the resistant 
groups. As argued in this chapter, resistant groups from the model enterprises are often 
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able to gain help from other worker groups. These model enterprises are usually of a 
higher level of ownership. Also, the secret information does not work for the workers 
from enterprises of lower level of ownership, as these could be interventions from local 
governments.  
In this chapter, it has been shown that the relationship between the local and 
central governments could exert much pressure on the workers’ resistance. Bearing in 
mind their political careers and benefits, the government officials tend to repress the 
resistance of workers and take side with the local enterprises. Thus, the decentralization 
of the system has an important impact on the social movement in urban China. 
 
4.2.4 Economic Resources Possessed by the Enterprises 
Usually, when the workers appealed to the respective office of the government, 
the officials would try to contact the managers of the enterprise and ask them to take the 
workers back. Hence, to a certain extent, the economic resources of the enterprise could 
be important in influencing the workers’ resistance. 
The complaints office at various levels was the official department which dealt 
with the LOWs’ resistances. In June 1951, Premier Zhou Enlai instructed the Council of 
Political and Administrative Affairs to issue a directive that required governments at the 
county level and higher to set up reception offices to handle citizen complaints. In 1986, 
the Central Party Committee and the State Council jointly set up a complaints bureau. 
Over the years, the people’s congresses, the discipline inspection committees of the 
Party, government agencies, courts, procuracies, public security bureaus at the county 





level and higher have also established reception offices or complaints offices. The 
appeals system is widely used for at least two reasons. For the government, the system 
serves as a channel to collect information on the social- economic conditions of the 
citizens and about lower-level cadres.164 For the citizens, it helps address a wide range 
of issues in the absence of a strong legal system. In China, power is distributed through 
the administrative hierarchy; local officials are appointed by their supervisors and are 
held accountable to them. Thus, the high-level officials could rectify the misdeeds of 
their lower-level counterparts. To sum up, the complaints offices are agencies which 
refer the cases to the relevant offices. 
The complaints office does not have the necessary economic resources to resolve 
the workers’ problems. Usually, when retrenched workers appeal to the complaints 
offices, the officials can only ask the factory or the relevant government to solve the 
problems. Thus, the economic resources of the factory and the government are crucial in 
determining the outcome of the resistances of the LOWs.  
The cases of DPAB and FAW exemplify the importance of economic resources 
of the factory in relation to the worker resistance. DPAB is under CNPC, which is, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the most profitable enterprises in China. It consented to 
pay all the retrenched workers’ pension contribution and arrange jobs for the children of 
the retrenched workers. Also, in the case of FAW, the enterprise arranged new jobs for 
the workers one month after their retrenchment. 
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However, the economic resources of the factory are not necessarily the only  
determinant for the workers’ success in their resistance. In the case of LFF, the 
enterprise went bankrupt and was sold before the LOWs took collective actions. The 
mobilization involved workers not only from LFF but also from 10 other enterprises in 
Liaoyang, thus escalating the resistance into demonstrations. These demonstrations 
caught the attention from the international media and the central government. Under 
great pressure, the city government spent its funding in advance for workers.  
Economic resources are critical in solving the problems of SOEs in China. These 
economic resources are from the enterprises or the relevant government. If the 
enterprise has enough economic resources, like DPAB, it could probably solve the 
problems by themselves, and stop the workers from disturbing the local or central 
governments. If the enterprise does not have enough economic resources, the relevant 
government will try to solve the problems. Usually, whether the local government will 
appropriate funds to fulfill the workers’ demands depends on the influence of the 
workers’ resistance. If the workers cannot form a big scale resistance or cannot attract 
the attention of the central government and the international media, the local 
government will not pay much attention to the resistant group. However, if the 
enterprise, like LFF, not only formed a big scale resistance, but also successfully 
attracted attentions from the central government and international media, the local 
government will even appropriate its funds in advance to solve the problems. As they 
say “big trouble for the government, big possibility of having one’s problem addressed; 
small trouble, small possibility of getting the problem solved; and no trouble, no 





possibility of getting the problem solved.”165 “Big trouble” often means a large-scale 
collective action that takes a more forceful form, like a protest, demonstration or traffic 
blockade, which creates more serious social disruption. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the eight cases of worker resistance in Northeast China. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, through ideological work, mass work, labor models and 
political propaganda, the CCP could mobilize and control the urban workers before the 
reform at the end of 1970s. With economic reforms starting from the late 1970s, the 
retrenched workers could still make use of the collapsed danwei system in their 
resistances. However, the hierarchical danwei system differentiated the workers during 
their resistances, according to their enterprises’ levels of ownership. 
The ownership level of the enterprise influenced the workers’ expectation of the 
outcomes of the resistances, the solidarity and mobilization of the retrenched workers, 
and political and economic resources possessed by the retrenched workers. First, as 
argued in section 4.2.1, the ownership level of the enterprises affects the workers’ 
expectation. The workers’ expectation of the outcomes of the resistances increased in 
enterprises at a higher level. Also, the danwei system provided the workers with the 
presence of organizers, the necessary ideological work and mass work. As argued in this 
chapter, the retrenched workers from the enterprises of higher levels of ownership tend 
to have denser network than the ones from lower level of ownership. Third, political 
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resources possessed by the retrenched workers is also important to the workers’ 
resistance. The retrenched workers from enterprises of higher level of ownership usually 
are more capable to attract other worker groups to support their resistance. Another kind 
of political resource, the secret information on the corruption of management and 
government officials, also helped the retrenched workers to succeed in their resistance. 
However, it does not always work owing to the intervention from the local government. 
Thus, secret information does not help workers from local SOEs when compared with 
workers from central government-controlled enterprises. 
The workers from the enterprises of lower levels of ownership can rarely 
succeed in their resistance partially because of the intervention of the local government. 
However, it is interesting to note that those workers usually can find new jobs after the 
retrenchment.166 It seems that less dependency on the danwei system have made it 
easier for some workers to get a new start. Future studies could be conducted to analyze 
the influence of workers’ dependency on the danwei system and their competency while 
facing the market.   
                                                        
 
166 In December 1994, Wu Bangguo stated that if the state was able to manage the largest 500 to 1,000 SOEs well, it 
would have taken a firm grip on the larger part of the state economy. This was the origins of the policy which has since 
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successful experience after retrenchment among the laid-off workers, fourteen cases in twenty were from local enterprises. 
In Fushun, most of the retrenched workers from lower level enterprises inburst into southern cities to get new jobs. 
However, few studies have been conducted to analyze the influence of workers’ dependency on the danwei system.  





Chapter 5  Conclusion 
 
5.1 The Theoretical Findings 
Since 1993, the collective resistances of LOWs have spread to all industrial 
cities in China. The collective resistances of LOWs severely threatened the stability of 
the society and the political and economic reforms, especially in the old industrial cities. 
However, the LOWs did not form a unique working class, threatening the governance of 
the CCP as predicted by scholars. In fact, the political and economic reforms still carry 
on. The variation of the resistance outcomes differentiated the workers and decreased 
the impact of worker resistances. As stated earlier, the two central questions of the study 
are: Why did the resistance of some LOWs from SOEs succeed and others fail? How 
did the enterprise’s ownership level influence the resources provided/given to the 
workers? And, how did these resources differentiate the LOWs?  
The answer may be found with the help of the HI theory. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, institutions are the formal organizations and the informal but widely 
accepted rules of conduct that structure a decision-making or political process. 
According to the HI theory, once formed at a moment in history, institutions typically 
sustained for significant periods of time, influencing political dynamics and associated 
outcomes in subsequent periods. In the case of the worker resistances in China, the 
diverse levels of the ownership in the danwei system differentiated the workers in their 
expectation of the resistances, political and economic resources, and mobilization. 
Although the danwei system had collapsed after the SOE’s reform in 1990s, the 
retrenched workers could still be mobilized based on the collective memories of Maoist 





China, by using the mobilization strategies inherited from the past. 
 
5.2 Research Findings 
To mobilize labor and capital, China established the hierarchical danwei system, 
since the founding of the PRC. As mentioned above, through ideological work, mass 
work, labor models and political propaganda, the CCP could mobilize and control 
workers and capital in the urban areas. Even after the launching of economic reforms, 
the retrenched workers could still be mobilized following the collapse of the communist 
danwei institution.  
The variation of the level of the ownership of the enterprise first influenced the 
workers’ expectation of the outcomes of the resistance. The expectation of the outcome 
of the resistance is crucial on the sustenance of the worker resistances. If their 
expectations are low, the LOWs probably will give up early or not participate in the 
resistance at all. As argued in section 4.2.1, the ownership level of the enterprise affects 
the workers’ expectation. The workers’ expectation of the outcomes of the resistances 
increased in enterprises at a higher level of ownership 
The ownership level of the enterprise also influences the solidarity and 
mobilization of retrenched workers. The danwei system provided the workers with 
organizers. These organizer had high prestige and ability to articulate the demands of 
LOWs when confronting enterprise cadres or government officials. Their prestige and 
ability to communicate was based on CCP party membership training and their hard 
work in the factory. Also, the danwei system provided the workers with the means of 





mobilization. The ideological work and mass work provided the conditions of solidarity 
in mobilization. The retrenched workers can be mobilized based on their collective 
memories of the Maoist period and their retrenchment. Through the mass work, the 
organizers can increase the density of interactions among the workers during the 
resistance.  
It should be reiterated that the ownership level of the enterprise affects the 
solidarity of retrenched workers. As argued in Chapter 4, the retrenched workers from 
the enterprises of higher levels of ownership tend to have denser network than the ones 
from lower levels of ownership. Retrenched workers from lower level enterprises have 
much lower expectations of the resistance and the organizers cannot mobilize the 
workers effectively. 
Political resources possessed by the retrenched workers are another legacy they 
inherited from the collapsed danwei system. Political resources included two aspects, 
namely, the relations with other worker groups and access to secret information. The 
retrenched workers from enterprises of higher levels of ownership usually have broader 
personal networks. Also, because of the political propaganda in the communist regime, 
the retrenched workers from higher levels of ownership may have models who can 
attract other worker groups to support their resistance.  
The secrets on the corruption of management and government officials also 
helped the retrenched workers to succeed in their resistance. Secret information 
provided the workers with both the impetus and legitimacy to resist. Secret information 
does not always work owing to the intervention from the local government. Thus, the 





secret information does not function for the workers from local SOEs when compared 
with the workers from the central government-controlled enterprises. 
To a certain extent, the economic resources of the SOE are also important to the 
workers’ resistance. The complaints offices in China do not have enough economic 
resources to solve the LOWs’ problems. The economic resources used to solve the 
LOWs’ problems are usually from the workers’ enterprises. Thus, workers from 
enterprises of higher level of ownership usually could get positive response from the 
enterprises or the government. 
The former communist danwei system differentiated the workers in their 
resistances. The local and central governments utilize the limited economic resources to 
appease the retrenched workers who are influential in politics. This policy separated the 
retrenched workers into different groups, thus forestalling the formation of a unified 
working class in China as predicted by some scholars.  
The workers from the enterprises of lower levels of ownership can rarely 
succeed in their resistance partially because of the intervention of the local government. 
Those workers have low expectation of their resistance. They give up their resistance in 
the early stage or do not participate at all. However, it is interesting to note that these 
workers usually can find new jobs after the retrenchment. It seems that less dependency 
the workers have on the danwei system has enabled them get a new start. 
Additionally, another kind of public-owned enterprises is the collective-owned 
enterprises. Workers from these enterprises are at a much lower political and economic 
status than the workers from SOEs. These workers are not officially encompassed in the 





danwei system. They have the least dependency on the former danwei system in urban 
China. Although their treatment after retrenchment was much worse than the workers 
from SOEs, they rarely resisted against the enterprises or the governments, according to 
the provincial year books. The fact of the matter is that they can usually get a job after 
retrenchment. 
The resistance of laid-off workers has not stopped China’s economic restructuring. In 
1995, the Chinese government started privatizing, closing down, or declaring bankrupt small 
state-owned and collective enterprises. In 1997, the government formally began the nation-wide 
privatization of small SOEs. By 1999, it further applied these policies to medium-sized and 
large SOEs.167 
Whether the enterprise is bankrupt or not, its level of ownership should be a critical 
issue in the analysis of labour resistance. In addition, the influence of the danwei system and 
collective memories of Maoist China could help in explaining why the numerous disturbances 
so far have not seriously disrupted social order in China. 
 
5.3 Contributions and Possible Future Studies 
Few studies have examined the outcomes of collective actions, especially the 
resistances by Chinese workers. This study provides an analysis of the worker 
resistances by using the HI theory. The HI theory can explain the complicated collective 
action through institutions, which have already collapsed.  
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The importance of this study also lies on its policy implications. Normally, the 
state plays a critical role in the development of the developing countries. However, to 
what extent should the state intervene remains problematic. In this study, the danwei 
system was once successful in mobilizing urban China. This led to workers’ high 
dependency on the SOEs. From all indications, these workers unavoidably lost their 
competency, when their SOEs have to face the market forces. Thus, future studies could 
be conducted to analyze the difficulties faced by these workers and SOEs in an open and 
competitive economy. It would also be useful to see how these workers could become 
more competitive. As stated in Chapter 4, the workers from lower-level enterprises left 
the danwei system much earlier than the ones from higher-level enterprises. In a way, 
the former workers become more competitive. Hence, future studies could also focus on 
the workers dependency on the collapsed danwei system and their competency while 
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